Automotive Playbook

Automotive Playback: Ricardo Montalban and the "New Small Chrysler"

2010-04-09T00:27:00.000-07:00

Ah, the 1975 Chrysler Cordoba as pitched by Suaveness, himself. Passionate. Expressive. Soft Corinthian Leather. Ricardo Montalban was the perfect pitchman for Chrysler's "New Small" car. Measuring just under 18' long (if built today, it'd be longer than the Lincoln Town Car), the new personal luxury coupe debuted at the perfect time.

It was such a sharp contrast to the year before, when Chrysler had introduced the wrong vehicles at the worst possible time. Just a month before the Energy Crisis began in October 1973, Chrysler unveiled its all-new full-size '74 models. Models that turned out to be the biggest cars Chrysler would ever offer - a full 200lbs heavier than their "fuselage style" '73s were. They therefore burned more gas than ever before, just as fuel prices doubled overnight and began to be rationed. While the '73 models had sold an impressive 234,229 units, the longer, lower, wider star-crossed '74s saw sales drop a ghastly 50% to 117,373 deliveries.

To their credit, Chrysler reacted quickly by taking its evergreen B-body midsize car platform and reworking it to produce the Cordoba for the fall of '74. It was the smallest Chrysler since 1964 and had all the chic luxury touches of the day. A chrome stand-up Rolls-Royce-type grille was flanked by Jaguar-like round tunneled headlights and parking lights. At the side, a Landau half-vinyl roof featuring opera windows and coach lamps recalled the classic luxury cars of the '20s. And inside, deeply cushioned seats, offered in velour or that famous "Corinthian Leather" were there to ensure serene cruising, or lots of sliding around on those steep mountain switchbacks.

If all of it sounds silly to you, you have to understand the times. Midsized 2-door "personal luxury cars" were all the rage in the 1970s. Monte Carlos, Torino Elites, and Cutlass Supremes sold in the hundreds of thousands to members of the "Me Generation" who had grown out of their late '60s muscle cars and into higher-paying jobs with better salaries.

Farrah Fawcett had just begun shilling newly declawed Mercury Cougars. So Chrysler took a decidedly more masculine approach and tapped Ricardo Montalban and his illustrious accent to do the work for Chrysler's new car.

And it worked far better than Chrysler had expected. Alone, Cordoba sales in '75 outsold the entire '74 Chrysler line, finding 150,105 homes that model year. It was a good thing, too, as big Chrysler sales fell again, to 101,444 '75s sold. The Cordoba would go on to continued success, selling more than 660,000 examples through 1979. By '80, Chrysler was in downsizing mode, and while Ricardo (fresh from his recent success on ABC's Fantasy Island) was called in to do the pitchwork for the new Jenny Craig'd car, the Cordoba's bloom had worn off and sales fell into the doldrums. Chrysler would quietly drop the nameplate after 1983.

So it back, relax, and experience the Mariachi guitar as it accompanies the mellifluous telling of the tale of a man and his Chrysler in 1975.

Automotive Playback: Chevy Ci-TA-tion Edition

2010-03-30T23:00:00.000-07:00

Ah yes, the 1980 Chevy Citation. GM's first stab at compact transverse-mounted front-wheel-drive cars debuted on an all-new platform in April 1979. The Chevy Citation replaced the old rear-wheel-drive Nova in the line, and featured an all-new optional 2.8L V6 for motivation.

Sales were brisk in '80 (over 600k that year alone), but problems showed up early. The front subframe, which held the engine and transmission, had a bad habit of working itself loose. It was probably safer to drive with no rear wheels, as the commercial shows because if you breathed on the brake pedal, and the rear wheels would lock up, spinning you and your 30 bags of groceries out of control into a tree or through someone's hedges. And that new 2.8L V6 had a nasty habit of overheating and blowing head gaskets because whoever designed the cooling system forgot that coolant needs to pass through the engine in order to, you know, cool it. And so the Chevy Citation, along with its Pontiac Phoenix, Oldsmobile Omega, and Buick Skylark platform mates, became the most recalled car in history.

But in April 1979, none of that mattered. They had a "thoroughly contemporary driving machine" to replace the aging, oversized Nova. Play the above and savor the pre-catastrophe optimism.

AP Spotlight: 1981-82 AMC Eagle Kammback

2010-03-29T03:48:00.000-07:00

The car in the spotlight this time is a rare car, indeed: the 1981-82 AMC Eagle Kammback. If you're under 30, you've probably never seen one in person.

On April Fools Day of 1970, AMC - America's (distantly) fourth largest automaker - stole a march on giants GM and Ford by being the first American manufacturer to offer an import-fighting subcompact car. The truncated AMC Gremlin was basically an AMC Hornet with its tail bobbed and the rear wheels brought forward a foot. And its love-it-or-hate-it styling and tongue-in-cheek name got people's attention quickly. The Gremlin's range of big, smooth, powerful (for the day) inline-six cylinder engines was attractive to Americans who weren't convinced that the imports' inline-4s could provide the power, smoothness, and reliability they'd expected from the bigger American cars they were used to. Six months later, the competing '71 Chevy Vega and Ford Pinto (Chrysler took the easy way out and imported Dodge-badged Mitsubishis, and Plymouth-badged Hillmans instead of making their own American subcompacts), debuted with only 4-cylinder engines, which would prove to be a bit more economical than the Gremlin's big sixes, but far less reliable and responsive. And compared to the - by then ubiquitous - VW Beetle, the Gremlin had similar fuel mileage, with more than double the horsepower, and far more interior space. Despite all of its big-car advantages, it debuted as the lowest-priced American-made car. And sales were good.

In '72, AMC ratcheted up their quality and introduced the Buyer Protection Plan, the first bumper-to-bumper warranty offered on the American car market. It came standard on the Gremlin, too, which also picked up a V8 engine option to catch muscle car buyers turned away by soaring insurance rates. AMC even included denim seats as an option on the Gremlin, as a way to reach out to the youth culture of the day. In ads, they called it "the car that wears the pants". The fun shape, practical design, trusty, powerful engines, and lighthearted advertising worked, and sales were brisk through the first 5 years of the car's run. More than 171,000 were sold in 1974 alone.

But then AMC spent a ton of money on cars that were distinctively styled like the Gremlin, but not as well thought-out - the '74 Matador Coupe and '75 Pacer, specifically. And when those cars didn't make the money AMC needed to keep the rest of its product line up-to-date, the little car company soon found itself in big trouble.

By '78, Gremlin sales were poor having to compete with minimal changes with an onslaught of new Japanese small cars. Only 22,000 Gremlins were sold that year. And so AMC took a little out of their dwindling cash reserves and facelifted it, adding a fastback coupe version to accompany its existing chopped-tail bodystyle, and called them both the Spirit for '79. What resulted was a car that looked much more modern, was well-equipped, and sold better than it had in years. For a time. But it wasn't quite enough to move the needle for the company, so AMC decided to sell a 5% stake to French carmaker Renault that same year to generate some cash.

But AMC wasn't about to give up. In 1980, the plucky company, again on a shoestring budget, took a quantum leap forward and introduced the 4x4 AMC Eagle. And as radical a concept as this, the first American 4x4 passenger car was, the car itself looked like little more than a lightly re-trimmed Concord (itself a facelifted Hornet) with 3" of suspension lift. But AMC gave the car to their Jeep division to tune the full-time four-wheel-drive system for durability, and the suspension for a compliant ride no other 4WD vehicle could match. It worked, too, and sales were great, considering the minimal investment AMC made.

Even though the Eagle was available in every Concord bodystyle (i.e., coupe, sedan, and wagon), AMC decided they could go further. So for '81, they Eagle-ized the Spirit liftback and sedan (nee Gremlin), calling them the Eagle SX/4 and - the subject of this story - the Eagle Kammback, respectively. And in so doing, they brought the Eagle within reach of subcompact buyers.

The smaller Eagles couldn't have come at a better time. Because of the second energy crisis in 1979, sales of trucks and SUVs, which had been burgeoning in the '70s, came to a halt nearly overnight. And Jeep was not immune. But because of the dovetailing success of AMC's aging passenger car lineup, they'd become increasingly financially dependent on the fat profits through high volumes they were making from Jeep. As soon as Jeep sales slowed, the company was in serious peril. So the new subcompact Eagles were charged with making up the difference.

The Kammback's basic shape may have dated back to the '70 Gremlin, but its boxy roofline made for better headroom for rear passengers and more space for cargo than its sporty SX/4 brother. Its upright profile, short, stubby wheelbase, large tires, and dent-resistant Kraton plastic flared wheelarches, made the Kammback look just as butch as the big SUVs of the day, as well. Especially with the optional roof rack and rear air deflector. Its short front and rear overhangs and wheelbase gave the car excellent approach, breakover, and departure angles, as well...making it a bit better-suited for off-roading than it larger brethren. And the Kammback also came with the exact same engines as the bigger Eagles - a standard GM-sourced 2.5L Iron Duke Inline-4, with AMC's own bulletproof 4.2L Inline-6 as an option. Either engine could be mated to a 4-speed manual transmission as standard, or a rock-solid Chrysler-sourced 3-speed automatic as an option. So the car had the power to go with the grip necessary to get it through the deep, loose, or messy stuff with aplomb. And the Eagle Kammback offered all of the above for only $5,995 to start - the lowest-priced Eagle in the line. An Escort GL 3-door hatchback cost about the same, with a smaller engine and only the front wheels driving.

There was one problem, though. As novel a small car as the Eagle Kammback was, AMC utterly failed to promote it. The Eagle wagon and SX/4 got plenty of TV airtime and a raft of print ad support, as well. But not one of those ads mentioned the Kammback at all. The company must have looked at the Kammback as merely an 11 year-old jacked-up facelifted Gremlin, and got insecure about drawing attention to it. While mechanically identical, the SX/4's body shape was much newer, having been introduced as the aforementioned Spirit in 1979. So the SX/4 got all the attention, while the Kammback was relegated to wallflower status. Sales reflected it, too. The SX/4 managed to find 17,530 customers in '81, while the Kammback snared only 5,603 buyers in its talons.

For '82, little changed, except for the addition of an optional 5-speed manual transmission and low-drag front disc brakes, which worked together to push the Kammback's fuel economy figures to an impressive 19 city/30 highway. But it wasn't enough, and sales trickled to only 520 units (as opposed to 10,445 '82 SX/4s) sold for the car's second year.

AMC was bleeding money fast by this point. The economy was worsening, fuel prices were rising, as were interest rates, and Jeep sales were not bouncing back. So the company slashed costs further, and the Eagle Kammback went quietly into the night after only 2 years on the market. Its rear-wheel-drive Spirit sedan companion was also dropped, along with the poor-selling Concord and Eagle coupes. By '83, the big news at AMC was the introduction of the Renault-engineered line of Alliance and Encore compacts. And the remaining Spirit Liftback, Eagle SX/4, Concord and Eagle sedans and wagons played a very distant second fiddle. By '84, the Spirit, Concords, and SX/4 were canceled. The Eagle sedan managed to make it to '87 before it was euthenized. And the Eagle wagon carried into 1988 before Chrysler, which had bought AMC from Renault (themselves owning a controlling 46.4% stake in AMC by 1982) in August 1987, finally pulled the plug on the 4x4 Eagle. It would be the last-ever AMC-engineered passenger car, and it died just as the sport-utility craze was heating to a rolling boil.

AMC's failure to see the merits of the Eagle Kammback resulted in lost opportunities and lost sales. Had their marketing department been able to see what the small, wagonesque Kammback had to offer and cleverly pitch it to people who had been scared out of their Broncos, Blazers, and Cherokees due to high fuel prices, more buyers would have queued up and AMC's financial position would have improved accordingly. But AMC's pluckiness turned to insecurity, and as a result, things didn't work out.

So the 1981-82 AMC Eagle Kammback remains something of an unsung hero today. It's a tough, reliable, capable, practical small car with relatively good power and fuel economy. Its stubby, brawny looks are oddly lovable. It's a gutsy, scrappy little car from a gutsy, scrappy little company that hung in there, advancing the game wherever they could for as long as they could. Yet for all the Eagle Kammback's merits, it has fallen undeservedly into obscurity, made by a manufacturer that eventually fell into obscurity, itself. So to make up for that, it has therefore earned its place here, in the Automotive Playbook Spotlight.

Why the new Honda CR-Z makes enthusiasts want to CR-Y.

2010-03-22T02:47:00.000-07:00

At the 2010 North American International Auto Show, Honda took the wraps off their new subcompact sports coupe - the CR-Z. Scheduled for launch as a 2011 model, the CR-Z is supposed to channel the legendary Honda CRX from the '80s and early '90s. That car was extremely small, had two seats, and could be ordered in a variety of trim levels, from the fuel-sipping 50+mpg HF to the hot Si, which featured go-kart-like handling and a satisfyingly quick turn of speed.

But the last true CRXs were sold to Americans for 1991. And Honda's changed big-time since then. In 1991, Honda offered only four models: CRX, Civic (in 3-door hatch, sedan, and Wagovan bodies), Prelude, and Accord. None of their cars were sold with more than 4 cylinders under the hood. The heaviest car they made was a shade over 3,100lbs. And their reputation for quality and reliability was unimpeachable.

Today, Honda sells us 9 different models: Fit, Civic, Insight hybrid, Element, CR-V crossover, Accord, Odyssey minivan, Pilot crossover, and Ridgeline pickup. They offer fours, V6s, and hybrid models that have been met with far less success than Toyota's have. Their heaviest vehicle is now 4,640lbs, or 50% more than the heaviest Honda of 20 years ago. And since they ended production of the S2000 roadster last year, the Honda lineup is conspicuously lacking with the performance models that once gave the brand sparkle. And, in the first 2 months of 2010, Honda recalled more than a million cars worldwide for various defects.

Enter the CR-Z. For all intents and purposes, it looks like a CRX redux for the twenty-teens. Short wheelbase? Check. Two-seat cockpit layout? Check. Sloping rear roofline? Check. Characteristic glass on the upper half of the hatch fascia? Check. So it's a modern-day CRX.

But hold on a second. The 2000-06 Honda Insight hybrid checked all of the aforementioned CRX boxes, as well. But no one hailed it as a spiritual successor to Honda's legendary Lilliputian. Why? Because the Insight's emphasis was on its hybrid powertrain, featuring Honda's then-new Integrated Motor Assist (IMA) system. Its love-it-or-hate-it egg-inspired design was hugely responsible for its awe-inspiring advertized 70 mpg highway mileage figure at launch. And the 2000 Honda Insight got everyone in America talking about hybrids as Toyota was still putting the finishing touches on its first Federalized Prius. What it didn't get people talking about was handling or performance, both of which were lacklustre in the Insight as Honda engineers were tasked with wringing out every last mpg from every inch of its design. Interest started off strong, but sales levels never were stellar. Only 13,889 were sold over 7 model years. By comparison, Toyota sold 334,723 Priuses in the same timeframe.

When Honda showed the CR-Z production preview concept in late 2007, Honda enthusiasts were pleased, to say the least. Visions of high-speed cornering, bargain prices, and Spin Doctors cassettes danced in their heads. However, when Honda unveiled the production CR-Z at Detroit and launched in on the new car's specs specs, vision turned to disillusionment.

Despite Honda's happy-face PR, the important details of the new CR-Z said it all: 1.5L four, teamed with Honda's IMA hybrid powertrain generates 122 horsepower - only 14 more than the non-assisted 1.6L 1991 CRX Si. That would be somewhat excusable if the CR-Z weighed the same as the old CRX. But it doesn't. Instead, the 2011 CR-Z has a prodigious 490 extra lbs. on the flyweight '91. As a result, the 20 year-old CRX Si gets to 60 in 8.5 seconds. The CR-Z's 0-60 time: 9.7...only 0.1 ahead of the not-inspiring Prius. So, on the performance front, 20 years in the hands of Honda's engineers have yielded us a car with only 14 more horsepower, a quarter ton more weight, and a much slower time to 60mph. Not a good start.

So maybe the CR-Z isn't really a CRX replacement. It's a hybrid, after all, right? Might Honda really be replacing the original, highly economical Insight, but trying to find more success by giving it better styling and trying to make it appeal to enthusiasts, as well as tree huggers? If they did, they failed on that front, too.

Taking into account the recent changes in fuel economy testing procedures, the 2-seat 2006 Honda Insight managed 48mpg in the city and 58 on the highway. The 1991 Civic HF, with a 1.5L four and no hybrid powertrain: 40 city/47 highway. The 2011 CR-Z will be rated at 36/38 for the automatic and 31/37 for the manual. So not only does it get 20mpg less than the original hybrid Insight, it gets about 10mpg less than the 20 year-old CRX HF. A 20" longer, manual Chevrolet Cobalt with no hybrid system and an engine half again as big will get the same highway fuel economy number as the much smaller CR-Z manual. So, for a hybrid with a small engine, it fails the fuel efficiency test, too.

What's that, you say? Don't count it out yet? It's a subcompact (160.6" long)! Maybe it's really inexpensive and its 2-seat hatchback layout makes it the perfect low-price high-value commuter car! No such luck, actually. While prices in the US haven't been announced, in Japan, the base car lists for the equivalent of $25,500. For a frame of reference, its larger, now 5-door, 5-passenger 2nd-generation Insight line mate lists for the equivalent of $5k less there. So, as far as educated guesses go, it fails miserably at the value-for-money commuter car proposition, as well.

And for that money, you'll be getting a car with an uncharacteristically cheap interior. And a car whose name will make people think you're talking about Honda's crossover, the rhymes with 'Z' Honda CR-V. And, if Honda decides to make a performance version called Type R, it'll be a shoe-in for the dubious Alphabet Soup Award: Honda CR-Z Type R.

So, despite the hype, the new 2-door subcompact 2-seat hybrid CR-Z appears to have all of the disadvantages of the original Insight and CRX (i.e., limited cargo space and limited passenger space) with none of the fuel economy advantages of the Insight and none of the perfomance advantages of the CRX. Throw in, by all indications so far, a prohibitively high price and it appears that Honda has cooked up a recipe for failure of epic proportions. It is a car with limited utility that does none of the things you'll want it to very well. As it appears now, only one word seems to be appropriate in describing it: useless.

If you're shocked at the severe degree to which Honda has created a white elephant, don't be. Those of us who have been following the industry closely saw this coming. When Honda brought out the Ridgeline in 2006, an Accord-based V6 4-door midsize pickup that gets poorer fuel economy than a full-size V8 Chevy Silverado, with styling that makes a '78 El Camino look good on the outside and a '98 Suburban good on the inside, it appeared that Honda might be losing their way. Customers agreed, as the Ridgeline's sales figures would make Crystal Pepsi's units sales look good.

Then Honda followed it up with the 2009 Pilot, which had a universally hated USB port for a grille and poorer fuel economy than its larger rivals. And the subcompact 2009 Fit, which, with its manual transmission gets the same highway fuel economy as a midsize automatic Malibu, and poorer economy than the midsize Fusion or 2011 Sonata. In 2010, Honda brought the Insight name back after a 3-year hiatus on a new Prius-fighting 5-door hatchback sedan. Although $2,500 cheaper than the 2010 Prius, the new Insight has been widely panned as loud, rough, unrefined, and delivering much poorer fuel economy (40/43) than its larger, heavier, more powerful Prius competitor (51/48).

And speaking of panned, Honda also released the new Accord Crosstour in 2010. It's a fastback 5-door AWD crossover with enough ground clearance to make it hard to get into the backseat (especially as you must simultaneously duck under that sloping roofline) and load bulky items in its limited (again, by its sloping roofline) cargo bay, but not high enough to enable it to do any off-roading. The styling proportions are all wrong, as well. From certain angles, its bulging nose, squinted headlights, and hunched back make it look like Quasimodo on four wheels. When Honda first released photos of the car on their Facebook page, they instantly garnered Bronx cheers by the thousands from Honda fans, lamenting the Crosstour's styling and questioning its reason for being.

And don't get me started on the freakshow they've turned their luxury brand, Acura, into these days.

Honda has, for 3 decades now, been on the march. They've long made quality cars with good driving dynamics, great fuel economy, and unmatched quality and reliability. The company that has long required its production car engineers to earn their engineering chops in their motorcycle department, is now the purveyor of overstyled, overweight, oversized cars (the current Civic is as big and heavy as the '89 Accord was) that are packed with content and complexity, but are underachieving answers to questions that no one is asking.

And the new CR-Z, as shockingly compromised of an effort as it is, is no fluke. It is nothing other than proof that its corporate parent, much like its cross-town rival Toyota, is wandering in the desert, being victimized by its own success. With cars cars as amazing as the CRX Si, Prelude 4WS, Acura Integra Type R, and Acura NSX were, the state of affairs today at Honda is almost enough to make an enthusiast want to CR-Y.

AP Spotlight: 1993-95 Mazda RX-7

2010-03-13T02:34:00.000-08:00

It may be hard to imagine now, as Toyota endures its current safety recall nightmare and Honda loses focus, but as little as 15 years ago, the Japanese auto manufacturers built not just solid, reliable cars, but exciting, soul-stirring sports cars. From 1985 to 2000, the list of Japanese sports cars offered in America - both legendary and forgotten - was massive:

Many of them had pop-up headlights, high-strung turbocharged engines, all-wheel-drive powertrains, and even 4-wheel steering setups. Back in the day, the odds were that if it was Japanese and had 2 doors, it was a technological and performance tour-de-force. They made the traditional American and European sports cars of the day look positively dowdy, pudgy, and agricultural by comparison.

By the year 2000, though, most of them were either gone or on their way out as their manufacturers stopped running the performance race, but instead raced to the middle to offer buyers bland sedans by the hundreds of thousands. Today, only 6 of the above sports car legends survive in any form. This week's Car of the Week celebrates the prettiest, yet among the shortest-lived (in America, anyway) of them all - the 1993-95 Mazda RX-7.

Of all the major Japanese auto manufacturers, Mazda has always gone their own way. Ever since their entrance into the American market in 1970, the company has positioned itself as a maker of vehicles that had a few things in common with each other: responsiveness, attainable performance, and driving enjoyment best described by their own marketing department as "zoom-zoom".

When the first generation RX-7 debuted on American soil, Mazda was in serious trouble. The company had staked its reputation on cars (and even small pickups) motivated by powerful, compact, lightweight, revolutionary Wankel Rotary engines. Known for incredibly smooth operation, simplicity derived from using very few moving parts, and unbelievable power output for its size, engineers the world over were starstruck by the rotary when it debuted under the hoods of German NSUs and Japanese Mazdas in the late 1960s. Mercedes-Benz, General Motors, and Citroen in particular jumped on the 3-lobe bandwagon and came up with their own designs, fully intending to produce them for use in the retail auto market.

However, the advantages that rotary engines had were offset by some major disadvantages, chief among them being high fuel consumption. But that particular drawback, at the height of the muscle car era when gas prices were around 35 cents a gallon, didn't really matter to most people.

When the first energy crisis hit in October 1973, fuel prices skyrocketed as gasoline was rationed and people waited for hours in miles-long lines to put a few gallons of gas at a time in their tanks. These conditions effectively killed the Mercedes, GM, and Citroen rotary projects where they stood. But it was especially bad news for Mazda, which had a product line chock full of rotary-equipped compact coupes, sedans and wagons that yielded fuel economy on par with the much bigger fuel-swilling V8-powered American cars of the day. As a result, Mazda saw sales plunge from 105k cars sold in 1973 to 35k in '76. So they worked with all possible haste to replace their rotary-engined lineup with cars powered by more economical conventional piston engines.

But the plucky little carmaker didn't give up on the rotary engine design. They continued to develop it, and find greater efficiencies with it. And by 1978, with a razor-sharp focus guiding them, they found the engine's calling in life, placing it under the hood of a sexy, new 2-seat hatchback sports coupe called the RX-7. In so doing, a new automotive legend was born. And it would be the only Mazda vehicle sold in North America to carry the engine from that point until its cancellation.

The strategy worked. When the second gas crisis hit in 1979, sales for the whole brand nearly quintupled, to 156k. And along with the piston-engined line, the RX-7 found plenty of homes, too.

For 1985, the RX-7's twin-rotor engine grew from 1.1 to 1.3 litres displacement, good for 135 horsepower. By comparison, the much bigger, heavier Camaro Z-28, with its standard 5.0L V8, managed 155. In 1986, the RX-7 saw its first full redesign, and along with it, optional turbocharging. The latter updated would bring the little spinner's output up to 182 horsepower.

For 1993, Mazda once again redesigned the car and thoroughly updated the engine. Still a 1.3L, the 13B-REW - as it was called internally at Mazda - mill had twin intercooled turbochargers strapped to it. They worked in concert to achieve a staggering 255 horsepower, pushing the 2800lb car from zero to 60mph in a claimed 4.9 seconds.

But the '93 RX-7 wasn't just about putting up the performance numbers. Its incredible engine was wrapped in a sexy, curvaceous liftback coupe body featuring blacked-out horizontal taillights, front fender exhaust scoops mounted aft of the front wheel arches, a Jaguar-esque gaping grille opening, and cleverly hidden doorhandles. The car retained its characteristic retractable headlights, yet showed extremely cool scooped door shut lines that gave every aspiring young car nut across America - including myself - the inspiration to put them on every car we'd sketch in our notebooks at the back of our classrooms for years to come.

Initial reviews of the car were extremely positive. Acceleration was mind-blowing. Handling was phenomenal. And fuel consumption, though still below ideal, was improved despite the massive increase in power. Criticisms were focused around the hard ride quality, cramped interior quarters, and steep asking price ($32,500 base in 1993). But the sinewy, muscular, yet elegant styling was what set many-an-auto journalist's heart aflutter.

However, the poor ride quality and high price conspired to do the car in on the American market. Mazda engineers tampered with the suspension settings, softening the standard setups for 1994 and again in 1995, while offering the original tuning as a performance option. But their efforts would ultimately be in vain. When, at the end of the 1995 model year, dealers still had droves of them on lots, Mazda decided to pull the plug on importation to the States. And despite the presence of the 4-door, 4-seat RX-8 on our shores today, the original RX-7 concept hasn't been seen here since.

Despite the car's poor sales performance, resale values have held up quite well. A good condition '95 example books today for $18,500. Its Dodge Stealth R/T turbo AWD and Porsche 968 competitors list for less than $8k, and $14k, respectively, in the same condition.

And after 17 years, its luscious styling has aged gracefully, indeed. Comparing the Mazda's styling today to its contemporary Mitsubishi 3000GT rival is like comparing Jennifer Aniston to Kirstie Alley in the ways they have tacked on the years. In fact, as a testament to the inherent goodness of the design, Mazda kept the 3rd generation RX-7 in production with minimal exterior modifications for Japanese consumption through the end of 2002.

But that's not the end of the story. Rumor has it that Mazda is hard at work on a 4th generation RX-7 that's supposed to feature an all-new rotary engine. Given the current economic downturn and ever-tightening fuel economy and emissions regulations, whether the RX-7 redux ever sees the light of day is certainly still in question.

Toyota/Lexus, Honda/Acura, and to a lesser extent, Nissan, have largely ditched their performance credentials as they've sought instead to peddle large pickups, SUVs, and what equates to beige midsize 4-door tumble dryers to the unimaginative middle of the market. Subaru is heading that direction, as well. Isuzu long since stopped selling passenger cars, and pulled out of the American market entirely (and quietly) after the '08 model year. Mitsubishi and Suzuki are near death in the US, as it stands now.

But Mazda is still hanging in there. They're more than happy to offer any number of piston-engined small and midsize cars and crossovers that'll surely put a smile on your face if you let them. The current RX-8, though no RX-7 successor, will certainly do that, in spades. The MX-5 Miata is as sharp as ever, too. The company that has put "zoom-zoom" in their commercials for 10 years and in their cars for 40, is now the only Japanese automaker still keeping the faith as alive for enthusiasts today as they were when their factories were pumping out RX-7s.

To my mind, though, the '93-95 RX-7 is the prettiest Japanese production car ever made. Its engineering remains clever and novel. Its performance is still exceptional. Its design is timeless. The 3rd-generation RX-7 is, to this day, nothing short of spectacular. And so it earns its place as Car of the Week.

Toyota: Moving Forward Comes Back to Bite

2010-02-27T18:08:00.000-08:00

By now, you've seen and heard about the massive safety recalls that Toyota is undergoing. You know that Toyota has had to recall more than 8 million vehicles worldwide for various safety issues, ranging from floormats to accelerator pedals to brakes and, soon, steering systems. At least 34 people (UPDATE: 56 as of 2/28) have died from these issues, hundreds have been injured, more than a thousand have been involved in accidents, and hundreds of thousands have been inconvenienced and are beginning to see their resale values drop. No fewer than 46 class-action lawsuits have been filed against the automaker, with claims ranging from vehicle loss-of-use and lost value to wrongful death.

The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration forced Toyota to stop production and sale of the 8 affected models because, 5 days after Toyota announced the problem with no fix ready, Toyota was still building and shipping cars with faulty parts. And from the day the production halt was announced to the ads Toyota is currently airing, the company has been taking credit for that decision when they were legally forced into it.

Not one day of this entire recall/safety debacle has provided the public with facts that have added up. Few people, if anyone at all, seem to be in on what the issue is, including Toyota itself. Toyota has pointed fingers at CTS, the supplier that builds the accelerator pedal assemblies, saying that CTS was building them with flaws. CTS has pointed its fingers right back, saying that they've built the pedals to Toyota's exact specifications. ABC News released a story showing a college professor replicating unintended acceleration through an electronic fault that failed to show up on mechanical diagnostic equipment. Toyota has questioned the professor's methods.

Congress has hauled Akio Toyoda, grandson of the founder of Toyota and CEO of the company, to D.C. and asked probing questions. Jim Lentz, Toyota North America's COO and President testified, as well, mentioning that it's possible Toyota's fixes may not mitigate future instances of sudden unintended acceleration. Both have vascillated between admitting and denying that Toyota's rapid expansion since the 1990s has contributed to the quality, safety, and oversight problems they currently face. Congress has subpoenaed sensitive whistleblower documents from Demetrios Biller, a former lawyer for Toyota, which showed damning evidence that Toyota willfully covered up safety faults in the past, as well.

Other documents surfaced showing that Toyota took credit for saving $100 million by negotiating with the Federal government to limit the scope of its floormat recalls. Other "safety wins" as described in the document involved the company dragging its feet on recalling defective vehicles, and delaying their meeting compliance requirement for safety equipment.

Questions of what Toyota knew and when they knew it have continued to go unanswered. As information about past Toyota acceleration-related recalls have been released, more and more it appears that the company has taken an extremely active role in suppressing, obfuscating, or denying safety and quality concerns. In 2004, Toyota hired away officials from the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). From that point on, the NHTSA revised its investigative guidelines to overlook instances of sudden unintended acceleration that lasted 2 seconds or more.

And the hits keep on coming. The day after Ray LaHood, the Secretary of Transportation, accused Toyota of being "a little safety deaf", reports broke that Toyota erroneously printed on its legally regulated window stickers that certain 2010 Matrix models were equipped with knee-protecting airbags. When owners discovered that their vehicles did not have the airbags, they contacted their dealers, who informed them that their cars could not physically be equipped with the features. Toyota then sent each customer a token $50 American Express gift card and a letter of apology.

And news reports have been filtering in about a Minnesota man, sentenced to 8 years in prison on counts of vehicular homicide. He was returning home from church in his 1996 Camry with his pregnant wife when he stuck and killed three people in their car at 90 mph. He claimed in his defense that his vehicle accelerated involuntarily. When he attempted to brake, the vehicle was unresponsive. No mechanical faults were found with the vehicle, so the jury convicted him. That case is now under review.

The torrent of ink falling on Toyota's safety foibles has turned into an overwhelming flash flood. And through the endless reports and the media hysteria, it's been tough to know which way is up. Some have speculated that the Federal Government, fresh from having bailed out GM and Chrysler, is unfairly burdening their biggest competitor with these recalls and investigations. Others see the fever pitched media hype as dubious, recalling the unwarranted panics from the '80s and '90s with Audi and GM safety concerns that turned out to be without merit.

Clearly, Toyota is in trouble. The money spent in issuing recalls, fixing vehicles, stopping production, and lost sales is massive. Even greater still is the degree to which Toyota's once impeccable reputation for quality and safety has been torn to shreds in an instant. But Toyota themselves have not helped their cause. Their PR department, sending at first no information, then a sea of confusing and often self-contradictory information, has been at a loss to control the story. Advertising hasn't helped much, either. Continuing to promote the "Moving Forward" tagline amid the unintended acceleration investigation has shown the company to be shockingly tone-deaf. And releasing a zombie-themed ad for the Corolla in the face of a mounting accidental death toll was clearly a bad idea, too.

Civil and criminal investigations are also proceeding. So there is a sense in which, for all we know now, we've seen just the tip of the iceberg that the Toyota supertanker "moved forward" into.

The short-term aftermath is already making itself known. As mentioned earlier, resale values on Toyotas have dropped. Current owners are saying that they're more likely to consider other brands first at trade-in time. Some publications have predicted that Toyota's February sales will announce Toyota's poorest market share showing in 5 years, with competitors Nissan and Hyundai taking up much of the slack.

The long-term effect on Toyota is tougher to gauge, and it depends greatly on how this mammoth maelstrom changes the company from the inside. If Toyota does make changes to its management structure, its safety and engineering policies tighten, and it lets sunshine in on problems and concerns, they'll certainly take a hit, but they'll recover. The American consumer has been shown to have a short memory span with issues like this.

Ford and Firestone were dealt a blow (or is that blowout?) 10 years ago with the much-publicized Explorer rollover epidemic. The problems weren't quite as deep or wide-ranging as what's coming out about Toyota. But still, all the major publications bought reams of paper by the truckload to report on it. Customers got scared and companies got investigated. And the longstanding relationship between Ford and Firestone was put in serious jeopardy. But now, 10 years later, Ford is growing from strength to strength. Customers are back in droves, bursting with patriotic pride, more than happy to consider the brand's products at purchase time.

So, given enough time, can Toyota recover? Absolutely.

Given the level of corruption, negligence, and incompetence that Toyota has exhibited, should they recover? If they right the ship, yes.

Will they recover? Stay tuned.

AP Spotlight: 1962-70 Jaguar Mark X and 420G

2010-02-06T23:52:00.000-08:00

In honor of the 75th Anniversary of the Jaguar name, this week's feature is the car that would inspire Jaguar design for nearly 50 years: the large, lush, and lustrous Jaguar Mark X and 420G, made from 1962-70.

The Mark X was a milestone vehicle for Jaguar, in part because it set the styling mold in which most Jaguars would be cast for 48 years hence. However, its importance in the Jaguar lineage was underscored by the fact that the independent rear suspension that debuted under it, at the same time as did on the storied E-Type, remained in production for 35 years, until the last 1996 Jaguar XJS rolled off the line. What's more, the 4.2L version of Jaguar's world-beating XK family of inline sixes debuted in the Mark X in 1964, and would go on to power the high-luxury Daimler DS420 limousine until 1992, an amazing 28 years later.

Sensibly, the Mark X (pronounced "Mark Ten") was the replacement for the rather upright and old-fashioned Jaguar Mark IX. Gone was the 1930s styling with curved fenders that were outboard the body. In its stead, a longer, far lower, and much wider body with flow-through fenders debuted to some level of controversy. Much of the wideness of the car's body was down to the thickness of its doors. In fact, the Mark X's doors were so heavy, they had to be spring-loaded in order for their operators to open and close them with the amount of effort appropriate for a fine large luxury car.

At the front, the new Jag received forward-thrusting lines with a lower horseshoe-shaped grille and Jaguar's first display of quad headlights in tunnels that the hood and fenders bulged to accommodate. The quad headlight look would eventually be featured on the first, second, and third generation XJ sedans, as well as the recent X-Type. The look has become so iconic, in fact, that in Jaguar's latest XF and XJ sedans, you can still see the look recalled faintly in the headlight and hood shapes.

Despite the car's unit construction, which dispensed with the typically heavier separate body-on-frame setup, the Mark X ended up quite heavy, at nearly 4,200lbs. But that didn't mean the big cat couldn't get out of its own way. With its standard 3.8L 6-cylinder engine (of the evergreen XK family) breathing through three SU carburetors, developing 265 horsepower and mated to a 3-speed automatic or an overdrive-equipped manual transmission, the low leviathan had enough go-power to motivate the car to a top speed of 120mph. This made it one of the fastest production sedans of its day, and allowed the Mark X to stand, head held high, in the showroom next to Jaguar's magnificent new E-Type sports car, introduced just 9 months earlier.

In the new Jag, technological advancement didn't come at the cost of traditional luxury and comfort. In fact, the Mark X would be the last Jaguar to feature an all-wood instrument panel. Plush leather seats and front seatback-mounted rear picnic tables with integrated vanity mirrors ensured that the driver and each passenger was comfortable and well-accommodated.

Despite the inherent goodness and the degree of advancement the new Mark X possessed, sales were not impressive. Part of this might have been down to the controversial (for a very conservative early '60s Britain) styling. Labor disputes in the factories would periodically plague the company and result in reduced production and lost sales. But perhaps the biggest pressure on Mark X sales was the availability of smaller, lighter, lither Jaguar sedans (Mark 2, S-Type, and 420) that would feature prominently in famous television shows of the day, as well as the shockingly lovely E-Type sports car that instantly became legendary. So the Mark X got lost amidst all the buzz surrounding the rest of the Jaguar lineup.

Jaguar didn't let the Mark X fade away into the woodwork, however. In 1964, the car received a new, torquier 4.2L Inline-6 that yielded better fuel economy, a slightly higher top speed, and an astonishing sub-10 second sprint from 0-60. The manual transmission took on four forward gears, all of which got easier-to-use synchromesh, while the automatic transmission remained optional and common in cars shipped to North America. However, sales only continued to slide.

So Jaguar, for the 1967 model year, lightly facelifted the Mark X by adding a chrome spear down the car's body side, a wide chrome vertical bar in the center of the grille, and revised front turn indicator lenses. Instrument panels were revised as crash-safe padding replaced the wood trim at the top of the instrument panel. Air conditioning - at this time rarely seen in most cars - became optional for the first time. The revised car took on the "420G" name. "420" indicated the car's 4.2L engine size, while "G" suffix differentiated the car from the smaller S-Type-based 420 sedan. However, the updates did the car's sales figures no good, as the smaller, less expensive 420 had adopted the larger car's engine and similar frontal styling, for less money.

In the mid-to-late '60s, things at Jaguar were changing fast. The company, independent until 1966, had merged with the British Motor Corporation - makers of the original Mini, MGs, Morris Minors, etc. - to form British Motor Holdings. But the poorly-managed money-hemhorraging BMH wouldn't last long, and merged with the Leyland Motor Corporation - makers of Triumph, Rover, and Leyland Trucks - to form industrial giant and perennial corporate basket case/nightmare British Leyland Motor Corporation in 1968.

The immediate effect on Jaguar, sitting with Daimler at the top of the BLMC brand hierarchy with the Austin, Morris, MG, Riley, Wolseley, Triumph, Rover, Land Rover, Leyland Trucks, and Vanden Plas brands all filing in behind, was minimal. That year, the non-G 420, S-Type, and 240/340 were all replaced by the all-new Jaguar XJ6. That same year, 420G soldiered on at the top of the range, and even offered its floor pan, engine, and more than a few styling cues to the aforementioned Daimler DS420 limousine, which debuted that year, as well.

However, with sales figures that had slowed to a trickle, a V12 long wheelbase flagship version of the XJ6 in the works, and a money-losing corporate parent bent on cost-cutting and rationalization of each of its myriad brands' vehicle lineups, it was clear that future was short for the large leaper. By 1970, the axe finally fell. The last 420G rolled off the assembly line in June. Since the first Mark X rolled off the line in 1961 a little over 24,200 would follow in the succeeding 9 years. About 10,370 made it to the US.

Just as it was in the showrooms of the 1960s, the Mark X/420G is largely overlooked by car collectors today. Most flock to the racy E-Types or compact power-packed Mark 2s and S-Types. Which is why Mark X's and 420Gs in good condition will set you back about $15k. The smaller Mark 2s and S-Types will run more than double that.

So what we have in the Mark X/420G is something truly rare and special. It's on one hand a beautiful, spacious, luxurious car. It has ground-breaking design, with modern engineering advancements that give it the speed and handling characteristics that its competitors could only dream about. On the other hand, because of its relative - and undeserved - obscurity, this classic full-figured feline is also attainable for those with more taste and discernment than money in the bank.

NAIAS Report: Ford and Chrysler

2010-02-03T01:00:00.000-08:00

The 2010 North American International Auto Show was a watershed moment in time for Ford. Riding high on American pride and optimism, the one major American manufacturer that didn't need a bailout or bankruptcy protection in '09 started the show in Detroit by sweeping the North American Car and Truck of the Year awards. The 2010 Ford Fusion Hybrid beat out the VW Golf Mk6 and Buick LaCrosse for the car award, while the 2010 Ford Transit Connect compact commercial van beat the Chevrolet Equinox and Subaru Outback in the truck category. It was only the third time in the award's history that a single manufacturer has taken both honors. To note, Honda did so in 2006 with the Civic and Ridgeline and GM did it in 2007 with the Saturn Aura and Chevy Silverado.

One look at Ford's massive, enclosed display said it all. The thing bathed the showgoer in a softly glowing shade of Ford pride blue. Henry's surname was to be found on every wall, in every corner of what looked like you had entered into a totally different, if not entirely well-organized, building. Ford's display was by far the most impressive among all the manufacturers and it exuded confidence.

Of course, Ford's big debut at the show was the 2012 Focus sedan and 5-door hatchback. In a raised, cordoned-off display at the center of the Ford complex, the new Focuses rotated, out of the reach of prodding fingers. The new car marks Ford's return to offering the same Focus in New World as will be sold across the pond in the Old World - something that hasn't been true since Europe got an all-new (and much nicer) Focus in 2004, while North America got two different facelifts of the new-to-us-for-2000 model.

When looking at Ford's new Civic/Corolla/Cruze-fighter, one is taken by their athletic stances and pleasingly rounded styling. Side feature lines create a haunch look over the front and rear wheels, while they're connected by a lower bodyside crease that adds strength to the look, as it does the integrity of the door skins themselves. The hatchback has clever styling touches, with taillights that extend forward at their outer edges along the rear shoulder line. This makes it easier to see the taillights from more angles. And the left taillight incorporates a cleverly integrated fuel filler door.

The sedan, of course, is more conservative-looking, with a tall rear deck and inward-slanting Audi-esque taillamps. However, the sedan's rear wheelarches manage to make the rear quarters look butch, rather than severely under-tired, like the new Fiesta sedan does.

If I have one criticism of the overall exterior design, it's at the car's front end. The lower grille is in three sections, with two triangular ducts located outboard of an inverted trapezoidal opening. It looks too tall, too fussy, and doesn't harmonize with the rest of the vehicle, or key into a family resemblance with other Ford vehicles. Above the odd bumper-mounted air intakes sit a slim rectangular grille opening. In the center of this opening is a single slim chrome horizonal bar, on which the customary Ford oval is mounted. If Ford hopes to create a family resemblance among its passenger cars, the Focus is clearly discordant with that goal.

You see, the new Fiesta sedan shows an oddly-styled 3-bar grille with chrome strips so slim, I call it the Gillette Mach 3. The Fiesta 5-door hatch features a body-color grille surround with a slot-type opening and a central Ford badge. The Fusion comes with a 3-bar chrome grille so massive that the upper bar stretches from wall to wall, above and around the headlights. And the new Taurus has a totally different textured grille treatment with a slim central horizontal bar holding the Ford badge. Now that the new Focus has broken cover, it appears that totally different groups of people designed each Ford vehicle and that none of them talked to each other while involved in their particular processes.

Scattered throughout the Ford display were various cutaway displays, showing the inner workings of Ford's new line of poweful, fuel-saving EcoBoost (i.e., twin-turbo direct-injection) four-and six-cylinder powerplants. The Mustang Alley was in its own corner and showed the car's all-new 3.7L base V6 and 5.0L GT V8, along with a new "California Special" trim package that featured bodyside tape stripes and a flush-mounted slim chrome horizontal bar grille insert.

Ford has 4 vehicle divisions, though. Not just one. So, moving away from the massive and impressive Ford stand to the small strip reserved for Mercury, one couldn't help but wonder how much longer Ford plans to keep the ever-shrinking brand alive.

With no new products to show, no major announcements about the brand, and the looming cancellation of half of Mercury's 4-car lineup, had you blinked walking past the Roman god's tiny, obstructed view display, you might have wondered if Ford themselves had forgotten about the brand. Much like customers have already. While Ford has announced that a Focus-based compact Mercury coming for '12, the fact that the Volvo stand - representing the brand Ford is days from selling to Geely - had 3x the floor space was quite telling.

No major announcements about the Volvo brand were made at the show, either. However, the recently revealed facelifted C30 hatchback and C70 hardtop convertible were on offer. Strangely, the all-new S60 sedan was not.

At the Lincoln display, Ford put in far more effort. With a tall, open structure finished in black wood and accompanied by a roped-off 1940 Continental convertible, the Lincoln section of the show felt very classy, avant-garde, and tied in very well to the feelings evoked by Lincoln's latest ad campaigns. But the Lincoln stand wasn't all show and no intro. A significantly facelifted MKX crossover was on offer, eschewing its old rectangular chrome grille for the divided crosshatch "wings" grille.

Also new is a front fender line that arches above the front wheel wells, giving a more powerful, distinctive look. At the rear, new taillights drop their former wall-to-wall treatment and in their place are two blocky individual units. In the luxury segment, design identity is absolutely critical. And while pleasing in and of themselves, the new rear styling ultimately fails to tie the revised MKX in with the rest of the Lincoln line's styling cues. However, inside you'll find a revised instrument panel with the brand's new MyLincoln Touch system. This interior control system leaves rotary knobs and buttons firmly in the past, and in their place offers buyers touch-sensitive panels modeled after Apple's iPod Touch ("MyLincoln Touch?" Ford got really creative with the name, didn't they?) interface. When used in combination with the vehicle's SYNC system, the car quite literally becomes a rolling personal electronic device in the iPhone mold.

While a very successful mid-cycle update, the 2011 MKX still highlights a greater problem with the Lincoln line at large: most of the vehicles too closely resemble the much less expensive Fords they're based on. One look at the Ford Edge, and you'll doubtless notice that the doors, rear fenders, and roof are still carried over into the Lincoln MKX. And they're pleasing enough. But they don't lend the MKX an air of special-ness. Of exclusivity. Or of outright competitiveness with other companies' luxury crossovers. Which is why vehicles like the Cadillac SRX and Lexus RX350 - both based on platforms shared with lesser vehicles, while sharing no external parts with them - handily outsell the Lincoln.

All in all, Ford had many good things to show for itself, including those twin North American Car/Truck of the Year awards. A promising new Focus, new engines, and a thoroughly updated and important Lincoln showed that Ford - while still facing many pressing problems - has every intention of continuing on its roll, riding the tide of good public opinion, clever new technologies, improved quality and reliability, and enough fresh, new metal to keep customers interested.

Chrysler, on the other hand, had a very different story to tell. Come to think of it, they didn't have much of a story to tell at all. Which is probably why the company never held a single press conference at the show. What they did have is shown above - The Chrysler Delta Concept...errr...Chrysler-Lancia Concept...errr...

Actually, Chrysler didn't bother to give the car a name...just a different grille and the brand's new winged badge. What it actually is is an Italian Lancia Delta. Confused? You won't be if you remember that Chrysler is now part-owned by Fiat, of which Lancia is one of their Europe-only upscale brands. And Olivier Francois, head of the Lancia brand has also been put in charge of the Chrysler brand. His task going forward is to converge the future Chrysler lineup with Lancia's, using different badges depending on the market the particular brand is better known in. And Lancia's newest model is the Delta compact 5-door hatchback you see before you. Chrysler would not confirm at the show whether this exact vehicle would be offered on our shores. Instead, they talked about it being a symbol, pointing to a future of greater synergies between the Chrysler and Lancia brands.

Beyond that, Chrysler threw a Ferrari 599XX and the new Maserati Gran Turismo Cabrio into the display. Fiat owns these brands as well. Also included were a pair of Fiat 500 hatchbacks, one with the hot Abarth EsseEsse treatment, the other with an electric-only powerplant. Both added visual interest to a display that didn't have much in the way of new vehicles or significant updates to show.

The updates to the Chrysler-branded vehicles were few and far between. The current 300, in its swan song year before being replaced by a redesigned 2011 model, showed off new 300S6 and 300S8 trim packages. Complete with massive wheels, smoked headlight bezels, and wire honeycomb grilles, but lacking the normal cars' bodyside rub strips, the new S models showed that the six season-old 300 can still manage to mix imposing lines with beautiful details.

Dodge showed off the Challenger's new "Plum Crazy" paint color, with write bodyside tape stripes and a striking white leather interior to match. As garish as that may sound, it looked spectacular. And it was all I could do to keep from drooling while I was within 5 feet of it. The nearby Nitro Detonator SUV wore its new, bright yellow appearance package, with tape stripes, revised interior bits, and of course, bigger wheels.

Jeep showed three new wheel-trim-and-graphics packages, as well. The Liberty Renegade featured a matte black hood decal, smoked headlight lenses, and special interior trim. The new Wrangler Islander and Mountain Edition were on the floor, as well. The Islander package resurrects an old Wrangler trim line from the early '90s, but this time, more tastefully.

The rest of the Chrysler stable showed the current crop of, frankly, lacklustre vehicles. But they were all dressed up with large chrome wheels, and appeared in paint colors that flattered them as much as possible. And the new 2010 Motor Trend Truck of the Year, the Ram Heavy Duty - freshly shorn of its Dodge emblems - was shown, as well, by means of a fascinating cutaway model.

All in all, what the Chrysler display lacked in new metal to show, it gained back in overall pizzazz. But it did serve to underscore the fact that Chrysler has a shocking dearth of good product at the moment. It's clear that they're doing the best they can - whatever they can - to keep the customers in the door and the company afloat until the new Fiat-funded products come online. But make no mistake, the next 18-24 months might be a little rough going.

AP Spotlight: 1970-74 SAAB Sonett III

2010-01-27T22:57:00.000-08:00

Car of the Week is back, and in honor of the recently inked deal between GM, Saab, and Dutch sports car maker Spyker Cars NV, Automotive Playbook's Car of the Week is a sports car from SAAB's past - the 1970-74 Sonett III.

As the name suggests, the Sonett III was the third iteration of SAAB sports car. The Sonett I, or 94, was sold from 1955-57 and equipped with a 748cc two-stroke inline-3 producing all of 58bhp in a car that weighed around 1200lbs, good for a 99mph top speed. The car got its name from the Swedish expression sa natt, meaning "so neat". But only six examples were built before SAAB canceled the project in early 1957.

The Sonett name lay dormant for another 9 years, until the Sonett II, or 97, was produced beginning in 1966. Intended as a racing vehicle, the little Sonett II competed well in contemporary Sports Car Club of America races, with its light weight and spunky two-stroke 841cc "Shrike" Inline-3 engine driving the front wheels. Criticisms by the motoring press - during the burgeoning muscle car era - had mostly to do with the car's lack of grunt, as well as its "homemade styling". After only two years, SAAB corrected the former problem by licensing Ford's German Taunus V4 engine. And, as befits legendary Swedish sensibility, changed the name from Sonett II to Sonett V4. But they made the styling problems worse because they had to redesign the hood with a rather unsightly bulge down the center to accommodate the much larger 1.5L mill.

Seeing that they'd made the already quaint-looking SAAB's styling worse, the company contacted Italian designer Sergio Coggiola, who helped pen a whole new body to ride atop the Sonett chassis. Debuting in 1970, SAAB called the car the Sonett III, and threw in an enlarged 1.7L V4 engine to give the car its highest-ever top speed of 103mph.

With its flat, low nose, slot-type grille opening behind which auxiliary lights peeked, and manually retractable headlights, the Sonett III took a fantastic little sports car and made it an endearing head-turner. And since the great majority of these cars were earmarked for the American market, where SAAB's traditional column-shifted manual transmission was seen as an anachronism, SAAB improved the Sonett III by offering it in America with the shift lever on the floor between the seats.

So modified, and armed with a low price tag, SAAB pitched the Sonett III as an avant garde and thoroughly sensible sports car. Its exotic styling met with low weight to give inspiring performance. Yet its front-wheel-drive and small 1.7L V4 made it excellent in snow, safe, and economical to drive and service. However, in an era of 440 Six-Pack Road Runners, GTOs, Torino Cobras, and Javelin AMXs, most Americans just didn't see the little Swede's appeal through all the hype and tire smoke the American muscle cars were generating. So sales never did take off like SAAB had hoped.

By the 1973 model year, the muscle car era was rapidly ending. With soaring car insurance rates and hugely restrictive government emissions and safety regulations taking effect. And the Sonett III was affected by them, as well. In order to comply to the new Federally-mandated bumper rules that stated that all vehicles had to wear bumpers that could withstand a 5mph impact with no damage, SAAB tacked unsightly rubber-covered beams to the front and rear of the Sonett. These gave the car an ungainly look.

They also added plenty of weight to the vehicle, which penalized fuel economy, the power-to-weight ratio, weight distribution, and therefore handling. What the government required SAAB add to the sports coupe in bumpers, they demanded SAAB take away in horsepower in order to get the engine to comply with ever-tightening emissions regulations. And sales subsequently fell through the floor and into the basement.

In October 1973, the OPEC Oil Embargo hit, which sent fuel prices skyrocketing overnight. Sitting in long lines at fuel stations became the norm for Americans until the embargo was lifted in March 1974. This had a catastrophic effect on the sales of any vehicle with sporting pretensions. But that wasn't all. Additional regulations that required vehicles to run on unleaded fuel and carry catalytic converters, was about to take effect for the '75 model year. At that point, SAAB decided that their stylish, sensible little sports car had been compromised enough. And with such poor sales, they couldn't justify the financial investment to make the Sonett III comply. So they threw in the towel after the 1974 model year ended and ended production.

Finding a SAAB Sonett III today is, of course, a challenge. While their engines are simple, their bodies are fiberglass, and their chassis were treated with plenty of rustproofing, they are far rarer today than when they were new. I have only ever seen two in person. But if you have a hankering for Swedish practicality, sexy Italian styling, and the desire to never pull up next to someone driving something identical, the 1970-74 Sonett III might be worth the arduous search.

2010 NAIAS Report: Chevrolet and GMC

2010-01-24T21:49:00.000-08:00

A few days ago, I reported on the showing Buick and Cadillac made at the 2010 North American International Auto Show. Now, it's Chevrolet's and GMC's turns.

This year at the NAIAS, Chevrolet's big announcement had to do with a small car: the Aveo RS concept, to be precise.

It was impressive. Considering the vehicle it's replacing, though, impressive isn't a very high bar to clear. The current Aveo actually began life in 2002 as the Daewoo Kalos. When GM scooped up Daewoo, amidst a massive financial/CEO embezzlement crisis in 2003, the Italdesign Giugiaro-penned Kalos was a decent product. For the 2004 model year, Chevy decided to plug the subcompact hole in its American product line by putting a new front fascia on the Korean-made sedan and 5-door hatch and selling them in America as the Aveo we've all come to know and...well...

Offering the new small car in America also meant that, when it came time to replace the ancient Cavalier, GM could move its replacement, the Cobalt, up in price and therefore make a better profit margin from it.

Aveo sales started off well enough, and GM updated it a bit along the way. But it wasn't enough to move the needle because, in the meantime, Nissan and Honda jumped into the market with the Versa and Fit, Hyundai redesigned their Accent, Kia their Rio, and Toyota replaced the ECHO with the Yaris. So Chevy's smallest car was quickly left behind.

The new Aveo RS concept is not exactly what we'll get in the production version, but it's extremely close. With quad headlights in round pods, nestled within slit-like recesses astride an aggressive, gaping grille, the front of the new Aveo means business. From the side, the surface detailing attracts your eye to the wheelarches, emphasizing the car's athletic stance. The reverse-angle rear pillar and hidden rear doorhandles underscore that the new Aveo isn't going to be a penalty box, but has some sporting pretensions. And from the rear, quad round taillights coordinate well with the fronts. The way the design is executed is a massive improvement over the current Aveo and makes it look more like a purpose-built Chevy small car, and far less like a re-grilled Daewoo.

Inside the concept, the eye is instantly drawn to the unique gauge cluster behind the steering wheel. To the left sits a traditional round gauge housing the tachometer. To the right of the tach is a digital computer readout that sits in a rectangular housing. The effect evokes thoughts of sports watches and again drives home the point that this is as much an athletic car as its predecessor is workaday.

So, from the looks of things, the new Aveo should go from segment wallflower to, if not homecoming queen, then the royal court, at least. And not a moment too soon. Ford, Fiat, Mazda, Mitsubishi, and Suzuki are all in line for the subcompact dance, as well. But the Aveo will have one big advantage in the American market: it'll be the only subcompact car built in the US. Its competitors will all be built in Mexico, Japan, or South Korea. That's good from a "Made in USA" marketing standpoint. It's good for jobs in the Detroit Metro Area. And it's good from a financial standpoint since the car won't be as beholden to currency fluctuations as its competitors are.

Also on the small car front, GM showed the latest version of its A-segment Chevy Spark, which is even smaller than the Aveo. When the US-spec Spark debuts, it'll should be one of the 3 smallest cars sold in America, behind Smart ForTwo, and close to the US-spec Fiat 500.

The exterior styling is an instant turn-off for me. Too many amorphous surface details show up on this car, making it look too tall, too skinny, and terribly overstyled. Every line finds itself sweeping back, until the rear corners of the little car are absolutely cluttered with all the different lines, bulges, shapes, and materials. And the bright roof rack rails only add to the Spark's visual height and narrowness. While the rear doorhandles are hidden near the C-pillar, the conventional front doorhandles appear to have been stuck at some random spot on the doors, with little regard for the way the myriad lines flow and how far the handle is from the trailing edge of each door.

As might be expected, GM is still tweaking this new small car, so don't expect to see an exact copy of what appears here at a dealer near you. For example, older press photos showed the front fender-mounted turn signal repeaters with clear lenses, mounted just above the peaks of the front wheelarches. They looked like cancerous growths protruding from the car's already misshapen front fender flares. The Spark they showed at NAIAS had amber repeater lenses, mounted behind the front wheelarches, just ahead of the leading edge of each front door. The NAIAS version is a much better-looking solution.

Inside, the Spark has a generally pleasing interior with plenty of clever little storage bins and areas that are color-keyed to match the exterior paint. The overall presentation is good, even though the materials on the instrument panel are hard, shiny, and cheap-feeling. Considering this car is going to run at or very near the $10k mark, though, the material quality is just fine. It's certainly better than what the last Cavalier or pre-facelift Aveo had to offer.

Even though the car is very small, the styling is garish, and the interior is fairly cheap, I appreciate the Spark. It shows that the Chevy brand is willing to take risks. It shows that GM is serious about offering not just a token small car, but a whole cohesive line of them, and isn't afraid to give them a little bit of flair. And the Spark is the exclamation point at the end of that line.

Moving up the size scale, GM showed its new compact sedan, the Cruze at NAIAS, as well. The replacement for the current Cobalt, the new Cruze is supposed to do battle with the Toyota Corolla, Honda Civic, all-new Ford Focus, and Hyundai Elantra. GM is very excited about the new compact and expects that in 138hp 1.4L turbo form, the car will blow past the competition on fuel economy, with an EPA highway mileage figure in the low 40s.

While GM is pitching the new Cruze as a compact that is moving up to offer midsize room and features, the Cruze is actually 2" shorter overall than the Cobalt it replaces. However, the new car isn't quite as new as you'd might think. GM has been around the world with it, having introduced it in 60 countries already, the first of which was South Korea in October 2008.

According to Chuck Russell, the vehicle line director for the new Cruze, it's taken two years for the Cruze to go on sale in America because Chevy has been busy fine-tuning the American version to make sure it exceeds our expectations. The interior certainly does. Its attractive, high-quality instrument panel shows off Chevy's latest Corvette-inspired "twin cockpit" theme. Uplevel models will allow buyers to choose between two-tone or cloth-upholstered trim on the fascia of the panel itself. The Cruze's interior is quite spacious and will feature 10 different airbags to ensure occupant safety. And out back, a torsion-beam rear suspension is augmented by a Watt's Linkage, to help the car take corners as happily as it saves its corporate parent money to make.

The issues with new the Cruze are few, but notable. First, Chevy's choice of using the Cruze name in lieu of Cobalt means that lots of money will need to be spent to raise awareness of the new car's new name. Civic, Corolla, Sentra, and even Elantra are known commodities because with each passing generation, the new car continues its predecessor's name. The Cruze throws away whatever public awareness there is of the Cobalt, which itself had to be established when it replaced the Cavalier. The difference this time is that the Cobalt name was affixed to an altogether decent vehicle, so there's no baggage that comes with the name.

The second issue has to do with the car's exterior styling. While certainly tasteful, and in places downright attractive, the 2011 Cruze already looks a little dated next to the 2010 Mazda3 and 2012 Focus. This may be because the car's styling debuted elsewhere in the world two years ago. So the new compact Chevy isn't so new. It'll need a mid-cycle update in the next two years, lest it age too quickly and drop from people's consideration lists. Especially since a new Honda Civic is coming soon. And for that mid-cycle update, Chevy will definitely need to jettison the black plastic triangles that poorly finish off the sloping rear window line at the C-pillar.

Chevy also had the upcoming Volt on display at the show. Scheduled to enter limited prodution this coming November, Chevy announced at the show that its revolutionary new electric car will go on sale first in California and Southeast Michigan. It'll roll out gradually to the rest of the nation before too long thereafter. Just before the show, GM held a press conference at the Volt's battery plant in Browntown, MI, where it showed the first of the preproduction fleet batteries rolling down the line. Engines will be made in Flint, MI, while the entire car will come together in Lordstown, OH, meaning that the Volt will be able to stand proud with a "Made in USA" label.

The rest of the Chevrolet line stood pat, although the new 2010 Equinox stood on a pedestal, no doubt in hopes it would be the one to win the 2010 North American Truck of the Year award. Unfortunately for GM, it was Ford's Transit Connect compact commercial vehicle that took the prize instead.

GMC had plenty of new metal to show, too.

Most of that new metal fell in behind the blingin' front fascia of the new Acadia Denali. Since 2007, GMC's full-size Acadia crossover has been winning fans with its all-around excellence. A more spacious and practical replacement for the old Envoy XL, and a more fuel efficient alternative to the standard Yukon, the one thing it didn't inherit from either of its linemates was the availability of an upscale Denali package. Until now.

Besides adding a second national park shout-out to the side of the big crossover, the top-line Denali trim level offers customers mahogany interior trim, a monochrome body kit, illuminated aluminum door sill trim, HID headlights, 20" chrome-clad wheels, and the traditional chrome honeycomb Denali upper and lower grilles. On the outside, the Denali repertoire is a bit heavy-handed. Inside, it's more tasteful. But, with 50% of Yukon sales being in high-zoot, high margin Denali trim, GM sees sorely-needed profit potential in adding the treatment to the excellent Acadia line.

The bigger GMC introduction at the show involved the smallest vehicle in history to feature the three red letters. Built on a shortened version of the Chevrolet Cruze platform, the GMC Granite concept is a 4-seat active-lifestyle compact hatchback box powered by a 1.4L turbocharged four with 138bhp. The same basic size as the Scion xB, which founded this vehicle's segment, the GMC Granite differentiates itself from the Scion, as well as the Nissan Cube and Kia Soul competitors by featuring strong, architectural design that doesn't scream "Young people will love me because I'm horrendously ugly".

The Granite isn't ugly at all. It's powerful and confident-looking, with highly technical styling features and hospitable design attributes. The car's "coach doors" open wide to ease entry into the rear compartment. With some modification, they're also production feasible, since GM Europe's Opel Meriva features them, as well. The right front and rear passenger seats flip and fold to accommodate a standard-size bicycle. The huge wheels nestled within deeply flared wheelarches drive the point home that this vehicle is a step up from its boxy competitors. It should appeal to people, young and old, not because it's some marketer's idea of what young people will like, but because it's an attractive vehicle that happens to be practical and accepting of lifestyles both active and average. And the vehicle design community agrees. At the NAIAS Eyes On Design event, vehicle designers from all the major manufacturers around the world came together to name the Granite "Best Concept".

The Granite serves as a breath of fresh air, not just to the compact vehicle segment, but to the GMC line, as well. GMC has long traded on its "Professional Grade" marketing slogan by offering beefy trucks and SUVs. But the Acadia and Terrain crossovers, with their decidedly passenger car-like mechanicals, have expanded the brand, applying its macho image to vehicles that appeal to people who want something more efficient. And rather than bastardize the GMC brand, the compact Granite Concept's uniquely GMC styling, its non-derivative layout, and its practical features underscore the GMC brand values, while extending them to still more new customers.

If GM greenlights the Granite for production, and they should, their plan is to eschew typical TV-based marketing campaigns and rely on the internet to get the word out to all interested.

All in all, the General Motors area of the 2010 NAIAS showed that company is bouncing back from a catastrophic 2009 with great design and an emphasis on practicality and efficiency. In many ways, they've shown that they're coming out of bankruptcy fighting, with great products and fresh ideas. Questions remain about the direction Cadillac is heading, as well as what Chevy's strategy is with the larger end of its passenger car lineup.

But GM has shown that they're up off the mat and they're deeply focused on the road ahead.

Coming soon: Ford and Chrysler at the 2010 NAIAS.

NAIAS Report: General Motors - Buick and Cadillac

2010-01-17T23:58:00.000-08:00

Automotive Playbook was invited by General Motors to be their guest at the 2010 North American International Auto Show this past week in Detroit. It was an incredible opportunity and an exhilarating experience. Although a guest of GM, I had more than enough of a chance to attend the rest of the show and examine what the other major manufacturers, sans Nissan/Infiniti and Porsche, had on offer, as well.

My take on what Ford and Chrysler, the Germans, Koreans, Japanese, and the more minor players showed and announced will be coming soon. GM, however, gets the first set of analysis.

At this year's show, GM was down to displaying 4 "core brands" - Buick, Cadillac, Chevrolet, and GMC - as opposed to the eight they had last year. It was extremely important that GM put its best foot forward, as it had a terrible 2009 involving a bailout, a bankruptcy, and big managerial shakeups. Because of my lack of concision, the Chevy and GMC perspective will be up in about 3 days. For now, here's Buick and Cadillac:

Buick is seen these days as the "wild card" brand. Few in the industry seem to understand why GM kept it, and what it stands for anymore. Fewer still see how the brand can overcome the old person's car image that has been associated with the brand for a couple of decades now.

It is clear, however, that the people at the helm of the Buick brand know exactly what they're up against. Craig Bierley, the Marketing Director for Buick confidently spoke of Buick's current and upcoming line of new products that he's convinced will sweep away the negative connotations the marque has carried. The Buick display itself certainly helped. With unpolished wood veneers, soothing beige tones, and soft, indirect lighting, the stand came off as modern, upscale, elegant, and comfortable. The Buick stand was easily the nicest place to be of all GM's NAIAS displays. And it perfectly encapsulated the image Buick wants the buying public to have in their minds about the brand.

Bierley and many others at GM mentioned that the transformation of the Buick brand really began with the launch of the 2008 Buick Enclave full-size crossover. According to Susan Docherty, GM's VP of sales, service, and marketing, 50% of Enclave's sales have been to buyers that are totally new to the GM family. Many of them are trading in imports like the Acura MDX. So it's a huge step forward that Acura buyers are now beginning to consider Buick.

But Buick didn't stop there. This last summer, the last-generation LaCrosse, which rode a platform that debuted in 1988, was replaced by a new LaCrosse, pictured above. The 2010 model features much more dynamic styling that brings back Buick's classic rear fender "sweepspear" or "bounce line". The dramatically-styled new car has been well-received by auto journalists. The LaCrosse even won Edmunds.com's comparison test against its nearest competitor, the Lexus ES350.

It's also successful in wooing younger, more affluent buyers to the Buick brand. In fact, the 2010 LaCrosse's first customer was a 33 year-old from Wisconsin, who traded in his Acura TL for the Buick. On top of that, one third of LaCrosse's sales have been to customers that are new to GM, while a third have also been under the age of 55. These are very encouraging signs for the brand.

So Buick has taken this encouragement and has gone a step further to re-establish its relevance to modern premium car buyers. The new 2011 Regal, which resurrects a name Buick hasn't used since 2004, is based on GM Europe's Opel/Vauxhall Insignia. It's a midsize sedan that's smaller than the LaCrosse and will come with Buick's first manual transmission option since 1989. It'll also be a 4-cylinder engine-only lineup, featuring a 2.4L inline-4 standard, with a 2.0L turbo optional. Buick is calling the Regal their "sport sedan", two words that haven't been associated with anything wearing the trishield badge in quite awhile. This car is set to go on sale in April 2010, and GM hopes its dashing good looks and aggressively low price will steal sales away from the Acura TSX and Audi A4. It's certainly good enough, as the European version won the 2009 European Car of the Year Award.

But Buick decided to drive the point home even further in Detroit last week, with its introduction of the Regal GS Concept. This car comes with an even more powerful (255bhp), torquey (295lb-ft) 2.0L turbocharged 4, performance-tuned all-wheel-drive borrowed from Saab, Recaro racing seats, huge Brembo brakes, polished aluminum wheels, dual exhausts, and, yes, a clutch pedal through which six forward gears will be rowed manually. If Buick decides to build it - and they absolutely should - the car should make quick work of whatever bench-seats-and-whitewall-tires image remains associated with the Buick moniker.

When asked why the Regal GS gets a 2.0L turbo 4 instead of the European Insignia VXR's 2.8 turbo V6, Regal Vehicle Line Executive Jim Federico said that the V6 would have needed detuning in order to pass strict Federal emissions standards. Its additional weight would have affected the handling, as well. Federico, who engineered the car while he was in Europe, mentioned that the car was designed around the turbo 2.0 four. Cracking a wry smile, however, he offered the news that the Regals's engine bay could easily hold a V8. When asked if the Sports Tourer (aka wagon) version of the car would make it to the states, Federico gave a "wait and see" answer.

At the LA Auto Show, Buick announced that they are working on a new compact sedan to slot in price under the Regal. It'll be designed to go after the emergent "small premium" segment of the American market, where the Audi A3, BMW 1-Series, and Mini Cooper currently reside. Federico also said that, if the Regal comes with a manual transmission, the new, smaller Buick will, too. And Craig Bierley even confirmed that a new, small Buick crossover is coming, as well.

While many people are confused about where GM is taking the Buick brand, one look at the level of excitement Buick's people have for the future of the brand makes it clear. Buick wants its relevance back. And it's getting there by offering cars with flowing "brush stroke" lines that recall, in very modern, pleasing ways, the styling cues of past Buicks, tastefully rendered design details, and satisfying driving experiences. Buick is also focusing on interiors that push the envelope of technology, modernity, and comfort while expressing high levels of attention to detail and craftsmanship.

Buick's biggest leap back toward relevance will be in offering vehicles with excellent performance, road feel, ride, and handling characteristics. If they can execute, they'll have the upper hand against Lexus and Acura. Without a doubt, Buick's people have their work cut out for them. But if what we've seen so far is any indication of what the future holds, that future is bright.

If only Cadillac had the same sense of purpose that Buick does.

Don't get me wrong. Cadillac is doing some great things. The new CTS sedan is an outstanding car, as good as or better than its Mercedes and BMW competition. Without question. And Cadillac has only built upon the success of the CTS by introducing a 556hp V-Series version that is so fast and handles so well, it broke the lap time record on Germany's Nürburgring track for 4-door cars. At least, until Porsche released its Panamera Turbo, which costs twice as much as the CTS-V does.

Cadillac didn't stop there, though. This past summer, they released an extremely pretty Sport Wagon version of the CTS, and a V-Series version is rumored to follow, as well. Two months ago in LA, Cadillac took the wraps off the CTS Coupe, Cadillac's first coupe since the Eldorado bit the dust in 2002.

And in Detroit, Cadillac rounded out the CTS Coupe introductions by pulling the sheet off its V-Series variant. Complete with a cockpit-style Saffron suede interior, incredibly angular lines, and a multitude of fins and scoops adorning the exterior, the CTS-V Coupe easily recalls the styling of the F117A Nighthawk Stealth Fighter.

So, when it comes to midsize luxury perfomance sedans, Cadillac has all the right boxes checked. They also sell one of the only relevant full-size luxury SUVs on the market, the Escalade. And they've improved it with its own luxurious interior, a selection of bodystyles, and more recently, the availability of a hybrid powertrain. The hybrid version makes the large, powerful vehicle as fuel efficient in the city as a Toyota Camry, while capable of hauling people and towing a boat or trailer behind.

So Cadillac has no problem with the Escalade and CTS. They communicate their desired messages loud and clear. They hit their target demographics right where Cadillac wants them to. With sharp creases and strong vertical line themes, their design language is strong, powerful, and distinctive. The CTS and Escalade show the world that Cadillac is at its rightful place at the top of the GM heap, the tip of the GM spear. And it's their forward-thrusting, aggressive, ostentatious Cadillac design identity that has affected the other vehicles in the line. Vestigial vertical fin taillights are perched charismatically on the back of each Cadillac. Bold, intricate V-shaped crosshatch grilles give each model a strong face. And edgy, chiseled surface detailing call out before God and all the world: BMW, Mercedes, and Audi, gang way...we're breaking through.

Where Cadillac's message gets muddled is in its other products - the SRX crossover and the XTS flagship sedan they previewed at the auto show.

The SRX is Cadillac's new midsize crossover. It's meant to compete head-on with the class sales leader, the Lexus RX. The freshly redesigned vehicle was just released this summer, and already it's risen to #2 on the luxury crossover sales charts - far ahead of the larger SRX it replaced. So what, exactly, is the problem?

The problem is, this car really should have been a Buick. In an interview with Steve Shannon, Cadillac's Executive Marketing Director, I inquired about Cadillac going after the Lexus when Buick is establishing itself as a Lexus competitor. The reasoning he gave was that Cadillac wanted to go where the sales were with the SRX.

You see, the last generation SRX was an excellent vehicle, based on the rear-wheel-drive CTS platform. It won Car and Driver's 5Best Trucks award repeatedly, and became an Automobile Magazine All-Star, as well. The vehicle received critical acclaimed and became emblematic to the motoring press that Cadillac had its eye locked on making better vehicles than BMW and Mercedes. The only trouble was, the first SRX didn't sell.

So it's understandable that Cadillac would go after better sales figures with its replacement. The trouble is, by using Lexus's formula, Cadillac isn't really leading with this vehicle. They're following. And it shows. The new SRX, while excellent, is not nearly as engaging to drive as its predecessor. The standard 3.0L V6 is outmatched by the FWD-biased SRX's weight. The optional 2.8L Turbo V6 cures this problem, but adds as much to the sticker price as it takes away in fuel economy. Which is to say, a lot.

So the new SRX's tamer personality is now decidedly discordant with the aggressive attitude the CTS exudes. It also means that Cadillac now has no direct competitor to the more involving BMW X5 and Mercedes-Benz ML. So the SRX is not a step in the right direction if Cadillac wants the same credibility level as the German luxury brands have. It's also decidedly "old GM" in the sense that it horns in on the Buick brand's territory.

The new XTS Platinum Concept also muddles Cadillac's product message. Not because it isn't drop-dead gorgeous and luxurious. It most certainly is both. Jaw-droppingly so. But what Cadillac needs if its transition to BMW/Benz/Audi rival is to be complete is a large V8 rear-drive luxury performance sedan. Something to give the 7-Series, S-Class, and A8 something to worry about. On the contrary, the new XTS is built on the same front drive-biased platform as the Buick LaCrosse and the next Chevy Malibu. It's shown with a 3.6L V6 with a hybrid system and all-wheel-drive.

God is in the details on this car. And it is achingly beautifully designed and crafted. Its orchid themed interior with petal-like details reveals layers of even greater detail all around. Perforated suede abounds. Wood, leather piping, and polished aluminum are used in expressive, tasteful, yet intricate ways. Should the production version be close in design and execution to the concept, it should find plenty of buyers and admirers. But what it will be missing is notable: V8 power, which comes standard on all of the aforementioned super-luxury sedans.

The lack of a V8 in what is to be Cadillac's flagship sedan is a glaring oversight. Cadillac pioneered the V8 engine layout in 1914. It's the inspiration from which Cadillac drew the "V-Series" performance moniker and styling themes. And it's a requirement if the car is going to play in the super luxury sedan segment.

Which only suggests that it is not Cadillac's plan to play in that segment. And in light of that, the new XTS seems to be much more a replacement for the current, hoary DTS (which, by the way, only comes as a front-drive V8). Mr. Shannon confirmed that the V8 engine configuration would only continue in Cadillac's performance-based models like the V-Series, as well as vehicles like the Escalade. And the V8s in both sets of vehicles aren't Cadillac's design, at all. Cadillac has announced no replacement for its own Northstar V8 available in the STS and DTS sedans, which they're phasing out. So it would appear that, when the XTS bows to replace both sedans, it will mark the end of Cadillac's nearly century-long era of V8 leadership.

Even though the super luxury segment isn't critical from a sales volume standpoint, it is absolutely critical for the establishment of a brand's image as a luxury car maker. The luxury brands considered to be "Tier 1" (Audi, BMW, Lexus, and Mercedes) all field entrants in this category. None of the "Tier 2s" (Infiniti, Acura, Volvo, Lincoln) do. And from the look of it, neither will Cadillac. Again, in an important segment, it shows Cadillac's reticence to take risks and address its image long-term.

However, there are forces within Cadillac that may change that. A new, rear-wheel-drive ATS compact performance luxury sedan is on the way. And from most reports, the BMW 3-Series and Mercedes C-Class have something serious to worry about. That's a very good sign. Cadillac's new General Manager is young and seems to have a handle on where Cadillac needs to be. But if Cadillac is going to come back into its own, the brand needs to offer credible entries beyond the $60k threshold. And they need to do it soon.

Stay tuned.

AP Spotlight: 1965 Buick Riviera

2010-01-06T01:10:00.000-08:00

A friend of mine just this evening asked me the following question:

If you could have any non-new car that costs less than $100,000.00, what would it be?

The answer to this question changes weekly. Tonight, as I was searching for photos of the vehicle in question, the thought occurred that my constantly changing automotive infatuations might make for a half-decent midweek feature for Automotive Playbook. So what the heck. I'll try it out.

This week, it's the 1965 Buick Riviera. This is an extremely pretty car, in my opinion. But I'm not alone in it. Sergio Pininfarina, renowned designer of many classic Ferraris, said that this vintage of Riviera "[is] one of the most beautiful American cars ever built; it has marked a very impressive return to simplicity of American car design."

The car debuted with this body for 1963. But by 1965, Buick made some changes. They moved the horizontal quad headlights from the grille to the front fenders. But rather than leave them exposed, Buick stacked them and hid them behind retractable grilles. This emphasized the width of the front, giving it a smoother, meaner look and gobs of road presence.

The dummy twin air scoops that were mounted on the rear fenders just aft of the front door aperature from '63-64 were dropped in favor of a cleaner, smoother look. Chrome rocker panel moldings stretched between the wheel wells, emphasizing the car's visual length, while reducing its visual height. To further emphasize the long, low look of the Riviera, Buick mounted its tail lamps lower in '65, integrating them into the rear bumper.

The '65s were also special because they were the first of Buick's personal luxury coupes to offer the famous Gran Sport option package. Buyers who selected it could get a heavy-duty suspension system, power steering and disc brakes, and a limited slip differential for better wet traction and faster starts off the line.

The centerpiece of the Gran Sport package, though, was the new 425ci (7.0L) V8 engine that breathed through dual 4-barrel carburetors, making 360 gross horsepower and 465 lb-ft of torque. Called the "Super Wildcat 465", the engine gave the 1965 Riviera GS athletic performance to complement its pretty-boy looks.

And though it may have only had 4 seats accessed through two long, heavy doors, the Riviera wasn't impractical inside. Not in the least.

Both front and rear seat passengers were offered more than enough space to stretch out and relax, with enormously comfortable seats and a light, airy, glassy cabin that freed passengers from the claustrophobic feelings that were all too common in contemporary sporty cars. The two rows of plush bucket seats were divided by their own consoles, giving each person, front or rear, the sense that they were being enveloped and cosseted by a truly luxurious car.

The Riv also earned practicality points at the rear, with a trunk that was easily commodious enough for four people's weekend luggage.

All in all, the 1965 Buick Riviera GS offered mighty performance, a satisfying dose of practicality, and good enough looks to cause excessive salivation. It was the car to have for the time. And today, 45 years later, it's not one iota less impressive or desirable. Today, a ridiculously well-restored example will fetch about $30-$40,000. One in good, daily driver condition should run about $10-$15k.

The 1965 Buick Riviera: GS or not, it's an achingly beautiful, competent, historically significant piece of rolling automotive sculpture. It's part of the reason that this writer has such a soft spot in his heart for Buick today.

Buick needs to start making cars like this again. And soon.

Power To the People's Car

2010-01-03T04:10:00.000-08:00

Volkswagen is the "people's car" brand in search of more people. A lot more.

In 2008, they won over about 218,000 Americans. For 2018, they're hoping 800,000 of us buy one. That would make for an increase in sales of nearly 400% over the next 10 years. It's 40% above VW's all-time American high water mark of 570,000 units in 1970. It's quite an ambitious goal, I think you'll agree.

VW isn't just thinking big for the American market, though. Their overall goal is to be the biggest auto manufacturer in the world, passing both GM and Toyota for world market domination.

Volkswagen has made grand plans before, though. In the late '90s, VW's Chairman and CEO Ferdinand Piech was on a high-end buying frenzy, scooping up luxury and exotic car manufacturers Bentley, Lamborghini, and Bugatti.

He laid the groundwork for Audi to move from a Tier 2 luxury brand to one that began to go toe-to-toe with the Tier 1s, BMW and Mercedes-Benz. The brand introduced proper competition to the BMW 7-Series and Mercedes-Benz S-Class with their own all-new aluminum-intensive A8 flagship. Audi took on the new luxury roadsters from BMW (Z3) and M-B (SLK) with the avant garde TT coupe and roadster. And the Munich and Stuttgart automakers saw massive attacks on their bread-and-butter compact and midsize sedans from Ingolstadt when Audi released the gorgeous A4 and A6 to compete with them. So, by 2001, Audi was on a roll, with its parent VW having worked hard, with success, to get Audi in the same thought as its German rivals.

So, with an ascendant Audi, a recently bought and successful Bentley line, an expanding Lamborghini portfolio, and hyper-car projects in the works for a reborn Bugatti, Piech and his Auto Group had the luxury market covered. But Piech wasn't satisfied.

The man was set to retire from the company in 2002 and before he left, he wanted to leave his mark on the VW brand by pushing it upmarket, as well. He surmised that, since the Volkswagen-owned SEAT brand from Spain and the Skoda brand from the Czech Republic had the low-priced volume market covered, he could start building more luxurious VWs.

There was one big flaw in his logic, however. In North America, the biggest auto market in the world, the company didn't offer any SEATs and Skodas. What they did offer were cheap, compact New Beetles, hatchback Golfs and GTIs, the midrange Jetta, and the relatively invisible Passat. And in the minds of most Americans, the first car that came to mind when "Volkswagen" was mentioned was the cheap, rear-engined Beetle of decades past.

That didn't matter to Piech, though. When the Passat came up for redesign in 1998, it was seen as a fantastic automobile, hampered by the fact that it was priced thousands above the competing Accord and Camry. Sales did improve over its rather mundane predecessor, however. When the Golf was restyled in 1999, the quality of its interior improved drastically, and its much higher price reflected it. And when VW's bread-and-butter Jetta came in for its redesign in 2000, optioned-out models were leaving lots with window stickers as high as $26k. But more Jettas were finding garages than ever before.

VW changed its ad campaign to explain that "Drivers [were] Wanted", and the vastly improved - if more expensive - vehicles did sell better than the models they replaced. But before long, reports about the new, more tech-packed models' common reliability problems began to surface. Stories of faulty coil packs, bad transmissions, broken timing chains, dead headlights, self-destructing engines, and fragile interior switchgear became much more broadly known. And publications like JD Power and Consumer Reports began to show VW at the bottom of their lists for initial quality and reliability.

Just as these reliability issues were coming out, VW was beginning its second phase of its push upmarket. The Passat was significantly facelifted in the middle of 2001, and looked like a much more expensive car. In 2002, a new high-tech W8 (not V8) engine debuted as an option in the Passat, pushing the Accord/Camry competitor up to the $40k price range. It did not sell well. And the next year, Piech's pièce de résistance, the $80k super luxury Phaeton sedan hit the market just as he entered retirement. It didn't sell, either. They also announced that a new VW-badged mid-luxury sedan was in the works. By the time the $60k Touareg SUV was released, heads within the company were rolling, as VW sales and profits were in a freefall.

It's not that the Passat W8, Phaeton, and Touareg were bad vehicles. Quite the contrary, in fact. But there were three reasons they weren't meeting sales expectations:

1) Luxury car buyers - particularly in America - wanted the cachet that the BMW, Mercedes, Jaguar, and Audi brands brought. The VW brand was just too pedestrian for them. VW's expensive models also had to keep company in the showroom and service bay with $15k Beetles owned by college girls and Golfs, which were bought by guys in baggy jeans with their hats turned backward. Wealthy buyers just weren't going to look for their next luxury car purchase at a VW dealership. This logic is what led Honda, Toyota, and Nissan to move upmarket by launching separate Acura, Lexus, and Infiniti brands with separate dealer networks from their downmarket sister brands. VW simply got greedy and overestimated their brand's potential as a status symbol.

2) Volkswagen buyers weren't typically wealthy enough to afford the new, more expensive vehicles that VW was now offering. And the sticker shock they got from reading the new cars' window stickers alienated some of them from buying the more affordable models.

3) VW had worked so hard and put so much money into turning Audi into a legitimate luxury brand. And they were only just beginning to reap the benefits. Volkswagen was now launching vehicles that competed directly with Audi's. So people who wanted an upscale VW could just go to an Audi dealer instead, get the four interlocked rings on their grilles, and head home with their heads held high.

The tepid sales of Volkswagen's upmarket cars, teamed with the rank unreliability of their volume models began to metastasize and company fortunes spiraled. The Passat W8 was quietly dropped after 2004. The Phaeton was canceled after 2005. Plans for VW's midsize luxury sedan were scrapped. And the top-line V10 Touaregs became much rarer on dealer lots as the more reasonably priced V6 models got the emphasis. But the adjustments VW made weren't enough to stop the profuse bleeding. For three years in a row, they lost $1 billion annually in the American market alone. By 2007, rumors of VW pulling out of America altogether began to circulate. Things looked bad.

But before long, sales began to stabilize, and VW's fortunes around the world improved to the point where their management felt that they could commit long-term to the American market. They drew up plans to escape Euro-to-dollar exchange rate fluctuations by breaking ground on a new plant in Chattanooga, TN. They launched a new "Das Auto" advertising campaign that highlighted the fact that their brand was the only way of getting fine German (or any other European country's) engineering at non-luxury car prices.

They also announced the development of the NMS, or "New Midsize Sedan", to replace the Passat in their lineup. This new campaign was developed under the assumption that the main reason Americans weren't buying as many Passats as they were Camrys or Accords was because the Passat was engineered to European tastes for greater feature content and more driver involvement. Camry and Accord buyers looked more for reliability, road isolation, fuel economy, and interior space. So VW has set out to engineer a Passat for Americans, on a platform that isn't shared with its European counterpart. And they plan to follow suit with their next-generation Jetta, whose design project they've named "New Compact Sedan". Their hope is that it will competes more directly with the likes of the Corolla and Civic, and sell like them, too.

And currently, sales and profits are growing in Europe and exploding in China and in Brazil. So VW is bullish on their goal of being the best-selling automaker in the world, and selling 800,000 units in America in 2018. They are quite close to achieving the former goal this year, but quite far from achieving the latter.

And I am skeptical about the prospect of them ever achieving the latter goal.

You see, while VW is one of the few companies that has shown healthy growth through the acquisition of other companies (i.e., Audi, SEAT, Skoda, Bugatti, Bentley, and Lamborghini), they're now in danger of their own brands stepping on each other's toes. Especially since they're planning to re-release the VW Phaeton on the American market. It'll still compete with the Audi A8.

Their dramatic acquisition of Porsche has been a wickedly expensive, dubious, and drawn-out affair this year. And it's coming just as Audi has released the R8, a respectable competitor to the Porsche 911. It's also coming just as Porsche has released their first luxury sedan ever, the Panamera, which competes with the Audi A7 and A8. Audi's Q7 crossover and Porsche's Cayenne SUV also overlap in their pricing structures. And Audi's plans for a mid-engine sports car to slot in under the R8 are now in doubt because that car will compete directly with the Porsche Boxster and Cayman.

VW has also bought a significant stake in Japanese small car manufacturer Suzuki just this month. This is seen mostly as a bid to get access to Suzuki's 50% share in the burgeoning Indian auto market. How this will play out in America, Europe, and China, where the two companies field direct competitors to one another is anyone's guess.

And as far as the American market is concerned, there are reasons to doubt VW's grandiose goals. For one, VW has done very little to address the quality and reliability concerns that are dogging their reputation. They can build as many so-called "American-focused" vehicles they want. But if they don't improve reliability and build quality, people just won't buy them. GM, Ford, and Chrysler took about 25 years to learn that the hard way, and two of them have only recently released products that compete and win on that front. Besides, as Toyota is now learning, the drive to be the biggest comes with its own set of problems. And with increased production tends to come a decrease in the focus on quality.

For two, VW's dealership experience leaves a lot to be desired. And they need more dealers if they're going to sell as many cars as they're projecting. That takes time and costs money.

For three, they need to send a clear message to the consumer about what their brand stands for. Reintroducing $80k luxury sedans like the Phaeton aren't going to do that.

Fourthly, these New Compact and Midsize Sedans can't be mediocre and can't be priced higher than the competition. They also have to perpetuate the "cool" and "German" image that their marketing has taken great pains to convey over the years. That'll be an incredibly tall order. Especially because VW hasn't really shown that they understand the desires of the bulk of American consumers. One of their newest vehicles, the Routan minivan, debuted with a huge and rather humorous ad campaign featuring Brooke Shields. However, in keeping with VW's desire to serve American tastes, it borrowed a platform from America's best-selling minivans, the Chrysler Town & Country/Dodge Caravan. Yet the Routan version has sold so poorly in its first full year that VW at one point contemplated withdrawing it from the market.

Fifthly, the new American-specific platforms are going to cost VW a ton of money to tool. That'll affect profit margins on those vehicles. And the competition, particularly since the economic collapse, has been going the opposite direction. Toyota is said to be commonizing their next generation European and American midsize sedans on the same platform. So is Honda. GM is already doing this. And Ford has just announced their latest "world car", the Fiesta, at the 2009 LA Auto Show. So VW is going to have to figure out how to make money by splitting their volume between their European-specific vehicles' tooling and their American-specific vehicles' tooling. At the same time, everyone else will be saving money by designing the same basic vehicle for multiple markets. Which will only serve to put more pricing pressure on VW.

And finally, in the American market, VW's share will have to triple from their present 2.1% to about 6% in order to meet their 2018 goal of 800,000 units. That means that they'll have to take that share from someone else. All the while, everyone else in the industry is planning for new products that they hope to drive share increases, too. The competition is getting tougher and moving faster by the day.

The people's embrace of VW depends solely on the company's ability to answer the challenges enumerated above. But if Volkswagen wants to become the "people's car" for the most people, they've given themselves a tough hill to climb and a short time to climb it. If they can manage it, though, then more power to 'em.

Taking the "Crisis" Out of "Chrysler" (Part 2 of 2)

2009-12-28T00:26:00.000-08:00

Chrysler has been drowning. It's not a big secret.

In 1999 - the first full year they were part of DaimlerChrysler - 2.6 million Chryslers, Dodges, Jeeps, and Plymouths were sold in America. For 2009, they may sell 900,000. If they're lucky. In the last 3 years alone, sales have dropped a staggering 58%.

As has been discussed before, this cliff dive is due to a variety of factors. The biggest among them is that, with few exceptions, their current product line is woefully behind the competition in nearly every measurable way. Quality isn't there. Reliability has been at the bottom of the barrel. Design execution has been subpar. Fuel economy is no great shakes. And for the 4 months between their emergence from a quick-rinse bankruptcy, and last month's release of their "5-year plan", they hadn't spent money to advertise their rag-tag group of misfits.

All the while, reports of angry, jettisoned dealers and Obama officials admitting shock at how far-gone Chrysler was when they stepped in has filled the void in airtime and column inches that their advertising would have otherwise occupied.

The rank ineptitude of the Daimler management at Chrysler was hugely responsible for the bad product decisions that pushed Chrysler to the brink. And when Cerberus took the company over in 2007, they brought in their own group of incompetent managers that only cut employees, plants, future vehicle development, and other costs to the bone.

So, since the year began, the bankruptcy court has decoupled Chrysler from Cerberus. The Feds have thrown them a multi-billion dollar life preserver. And Fiat has pulled America's third-biggest car company, floating listless in a heavy sea of fierce competition, aboard its own recently-mended ship.

CEO Sergio Marchionne's plans are certainly ambitious. He has acted fast, ending engineering alliances with Renault-Nissan, Mitsubishi, and Hyundai, and starting Chrysler on a path of better integration with Fiat AG.

But will the company once known as "Fix It Again, Tony" be any better for Chrysler than Daimler was? In a word: Yes.

Fiat has long been famous for its line of excellent small cars. From the days of the Topolino, the iconic rear-engined original 500, long-lived 126, internationally-successful 127, race-successful 850, critically-acclaimed 128, legendary, lovably utilitarian first-generation Panda, aerodynamic Uno, and utterly prolific original Punto, Fiat has come through - without question - as the car company with the greatest small car expertise of any automaker in the world.

They have cleaned house with the European Car of the Year panel 9 times since the award's 1964 inception - much more than any other automaker in Europe. And that isn't including the company's Alfa Romeo and Lancia brands, which bring the total to a staggering 12 wins - twice the number of the second winningest company, Renault. The current Panda and "Nuova" 500 number among those 12 wins. And with the subcompact Grande Punto, these small smash hits have catapulted them from death's door in 2004, back to greatness in the European scene.

But, with the exception of Maserati and Ferrari's tiny dealer network, equipped to sell less than 5,000 cars per year, they have no presence in the North American market. They haven't since they pulled out in 1983 due to lagging sales. Their terrible reputation for rust, indifferent build quality, and tear-jerking unreliability earned the company the "Fix It Again, Tony" reputation in the first place.

Fiat, however, has since worked hard to address all three issues, and has improved drastically in European quality ratings. Bolstered by this, they've been eyeing re-entry into this market. Until the deal with Chrysler, however, they were faced with the daunting task of setting up their own dealer and distribution networks in America. They'd have to commit millions of dollars to build plants on American soil so they could escape exchange rate fluctuations. And they'd have to overcome a lack of American familiarity with their brands, at best, and a dubious reputation with those who remembered, at worst.

Chrysler's realities just so happen to clear all of the barriers to Fiat's presence in our market. Ready-made dealer and distribution network screaming bloody murder for new, small product? Check. Unused or under-used manufacturing plants? Big fat check. Branding options that are more familiar to American customers than Fiat, Lancia, and Alfa Romeo are? Check.

So Fiat has decided to fill Chrysler's many product gaps with either their own vehicles or future models co-engineered between Fiat and Chrysler. This will reduce the investment each company needs to make to develop these models, saving them both sorely-needed money, while they can be sold in the US under the established Chrysler, Dodge, and Jeep brands. The current 500 will be the only exception, as the company feels that its character is such that it wouldn't be appropriate to badge as a Chrysler. Much like BMW doesn't put its propeller roundel on the hood of the Mini.

This works for Chrysler, too, because they've been historically awful at building smaller cars. And they currently don't offer anything smaller than the hoary Chrysler PT Cruiser, comically unrefined Dodge Caliber, and horrendously ugly, brand-damaging Jeep Compass. Chrysler's small-car engine line hasn't exactly been the stuff of legend, either. Fiat's has. So, Chrysler gets Fiat's good smaller cars to sell and Fiat gets a partner in Chrysler to help finance their development and a dealer network to sell and service them in.

But if you're thinking this is mostly good news for Fiat, and that Chrysler brings nothing to the table, leaving it to simply be picked over for its assets just like Daimler did this past decade, you'd be wrong.

Chrysler brings Fiat plenty of expertise in building larger cars. Chrysler's 300 and Charger, though aging, are still quite good cars. They were massive hits in 2005 and '06, respectively, when they debuted on the American market. Their predecessors were excellent. Their predecessors' predecessors helped save the company from its huge early-'90s slump. And the current models' replacements promise to be stellar. Look for them to debut in just a few weeks at the North American International Auto Show in Detroit.

Conversely, Fiat AG has swung and missed at making successful larger cars for decades now. Lancia's flagship models have, since the '70s, ranged from beautiful disasters (Gamma), to derivative boxes (Thema), to the forgettably invisible (Kappa), to bizarre throwbacks (Thesis). As a result, each successive generation has sold worse than the last.

The Alfa Romeo 166 was amazingly beautiful, but a depreciation disaster everywhere it was offered. And wouldn't sell, either. The car was discontinued in Europe without a replacement two years ago. It's not that they haven't engineered a replacement. The 169 was supposed to come out in 2008. But it's been delayed multiple times as the company does not want to allocate the prodigious amount of money it would take to build the 169 on its own unique platform at the sales figures (or lack thereof) they think are attainable. They've been looking for a partner from whom they can use their platform and just can't find one. Until now.

And the Fiat Croma, an odd wagon-type car, misses the heart of the midsize European car market by 1.61 kilometers. And its sales figures show that definitively.

Chrysler can also help Fiat with minivan expertise in Europe. The company's Fiat Ulysse and Lancia Phedra were under-performers in their segments from the get-go in 2002. And in the past 8 years, they've only yellowed with age.

In short, the new marriage will yield Chrysler-based offspring and engines for Fiat, Lancia, and Alfa Romeo at the large end of scale, where Chrysler knows what it's doing. Fiat has Chrysler's back with great small cars and engines, where their expertise is. They've even begun to commonize their components suppliers so they can get better pricing, due to the added volume each companion brings. And their CEO, Sergio Marchionne, has been smart enough to see the vast potential in the way the two companies fit together. He's proved that he possesses the wits and the wherewithal to right Chrysler's ship. He did so in record time with a Fiat AG that was dying as little as 5 years ago.

The only problem is that Chrysler has to stick with its current line of turkeys for the next couple of years. The aforementioned Fiat-based small Chryslers won't be done with the development process and the plants won't be prepared to make them until 2012 at the very earliest. So the question looming large is whether or not Chrysler can make do, if it can indeed foist enough of their current schlock, to survive the next 18-24 months.

In the meantime, the plan is to do some surgery on their smaller and mid-sized cars. Chrysler needs this badly. And the excellent little 500 will be coming in just a year. They've also got the hot-looking 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee, Chrysler 300, and Dodge Charger to keep bigger vehicle buyers and the press at least somewhat interested in the meantime. So, again, work is being done.

Will these well-laid plans be enough keep Chrysler from slipping forever beneath the choppy waves? The new blood at Chrysler are hoping like hell it will. And hundreds of thousands of jobs in the US and Canada depend on it.

The Plane Has Crashed

2009-12-20T13:03:00.000-08:00

Call the folks in from National Geographic Channel's Air Crash Investigation. It looks like we have some wreckage to survey.

Just this last Friday, General Motors announced that they were beginning the process of closing down Saab Automobile's operations for good. This comes in the wake of a breakdown in talks with Saab's latest would-be suitor, Dutch sports car maker Spyker. But Spyker was only the latest in a long line of potential benefactors that expressed interest in scooping up GM's ailing Swedish near-luxury brand. Just three-and-a-half weeks ago, talks also broke down with Swedish cottage-industry supercar manufacturer Koenigsegg.

Chinese automaker BAIC was in the mix, as well, and managed to get its hands on the tooling Saab was using to build the 1998-09 9-5 and 2003-06 9-3. They just announced that their Saab-based vehicles will be breaking cover from Beijing as soon as 2011.

Another Chinese automaker, Geely, also raised its hand to bid for Saab back in May. That didn't work out, either, and now Geely is going after Ford's Volvo division. And a couple of US investment groups, Merbanco and Renco Group, tried throwing their hats in the ring, as well. But no deal could be finalized. With the dissolution of talks with Spyker, a post-bailout-and-bankruptcy GM decided to leave its expert loss-making Saab brand without a safe runway at which their troubled craft could land.

Until now. Maybe.

If this all sounds like a mess, you're right. It is. But things with Saab didn't used to be so bad. The quirky automaker had far better, more stable days.
Saab Automobile was created as the automotive division of the Swedish Aeroplane Company (i.e., Svenska Aeroplan AB or SAAB) in 1946. The company released its first production car, the small 92, in 1949.

From the beginning, Saabs were known as quirky and decidedly advanced cars. Saab engineers had a different approach to everything in terms of vehicle design. For example, the 92 used an aircraft-inspired body so aerodynamic that most cars today still don't manage to cheat the wind quite like the 92 did. The car was powered by a transverse-mounted engine driving the front wheels, which enabled a flat interior floor and excellent traction on ice and snow, common occurrences in Sweden. Most car companies wouldn't get around to building transverse front-drive cars until the '60s, '70s, and '80s. Fellow countryman Volvo didn't start until 1986.

But that wasn't all. Race car-inspired torsion bar suspension gave the 92 a smoother ride and tighter handling than most rivals. And all early 92s were built in olive drab green, WWII leftover paint from the company's aircraft arm. Immediately after the 92 was released, it began a long, successful career for Saab in rally racing, winning the Swedish Rally in 1950 and Monte Carlo in 1952. Things were going well.

The little front-drive Saab would roll through the rest of the 1950s picking up many modifications and improvements, as well as a 7-seat station wagon variant, the 95, in 1959. It would add a two-stroke 3-cylinder engine, more rally wins, and a Ford-sourced V4 engine in the '60s. And the basic design would continue to be refined through the '70s, until its cancellation in 1980.

Saab moved into idiosyncratic sports cars like the Sonett, and upmarket to the safety-engineered 99 in 1968. The 99 was a massive step forward, featuring an excellent slant-4 engine mounted backward in the engine bay so that the clutch could be more easily serviced. It was the first Saab with its ignition key located on the floor between the front seats. This enabled the car's gearshift to be locked when parked, making it much harder to steal. It also meant that, in frontal collisions, driver's knees would not come in contact with the hard, compact machinery that steering column-mounted ignition modules contained. The 99 also featured an aircraft-inspired wraparound windshield, a clamshell-style hood for easier engine access, and a cockpit-like high-mounted instrument panel designed to keep all gauges within easy view of the driver. And sales momentum in Europe, the UK, and the US continued to build.

The 99 would show Saab's first expression of hatchback practicality in 1974 and turbocharged power in 1978. It was these two features that would become Saab's defining qualities for years to come.

In 1979, Saab introduced the iconic 900 line of family cars, and sales soared to new heights. In the US, the burgeoning Baby Boom generation aspired to European brands like BMW, Volvo, Porsche, and Saab instead of their parents' Buicks, Oldsmobiles, Mercurys, and Chryslers. Saab's first convertible debuted in 1986 and became a yuppie car of choice. A more commodious 9000 sedan brought in even more affluent buyers. And Saab began to set year-over-year sales records.

So things were going quite well in the '80s. And Saab turbo-boosted production levels at its Trollhättan plant to meet demand.

But then the economy began to dip in the late '80s, and Saab was soon overproducing vehicles that couldn't find customers. Their product line, while initially well-received, was beginning to show its age at this point. And because less money was coming into the company, Saab couldn't afford to finance their replacements. They began to cast out for a buyer, and General Motors was more than happy to take a 50% stake in 1989.

In acquiring half of Saab, GM was hoping to use its own Opel/Vauxhall platforms and components as the basis for Saab's future line of upscale cars. They needed the extra high-margin volume, too, as GM's European brands weren't terribly profitable, due to high labor costs and massive competitive pressures to keep prices low. However, the company knew it needed to give Saab a level of autonomy so that its future products, though GM Europe-based, would win over Saab's current loyal customer base.

The trouble is that GM's sales, market share, and profitability, particularly in America, were sliding, and their shrinking bank account now had to pay the bills for Saab, along with the Saturn brand upstart, and GM's six American vehicle divisions. So Saab's 900 (based on the new-for-'68 99) and 9000 (ca. 1985) replacements were delayed. This left Saab's cars to compete against newer metal from the better-funded Germans and nascent luxury car entries (i.e., Lexus, Infiniti, and Acura) from Japan.

When the all-new 900 debuted for 1994, Saab loyalists shrieked at its platform's Opel parentage, while many others were as put off by its quirky styling and lacking reliability. They were instead attracted to the critically-acclaimed competition from BMW and Mercedes-Benz, and entries in the emergent SUVsegment (e.g., Jeep Grand Cherokee). By the time GM released the funds to replace the 9000, it was 1998, the 9000's 13th season on the market. And its replacement, the new 9-5, retained a host of components from its predecessor, none of which was a hatchback bodystyle. Purists shrieked even louder at this last fact.

Saab continued to offer only 2 models through the '90s and into the new millennium. They replaced the 900-based 3-and 5-door hatchback 9-3s in 2003 (after a longish 9-season run) with a firmly un-quirky sedan lineup. And reliability woes continued to mount as the competition pulled further away from Saab in its market segments.

GM, facing even greater losses in North America and at Saab, decided to act by supplementing Saab's 2-car lineup with a new, smaller car. They contacted Subaru, of which GM owned about 5%, and asked if they could lend Saab the platform for the Impreza wagon. Subaru agreed, and Saab designers went to work hastily grafting a Saab-like nose to the front and different taillight lenses to the rear.

What emerged was the 9-2X, or "Saabaru" as people in the automotive press called it. It was instantly seen for what it was - a hastily badge-engineered Impreza WRX wagon with a higher price tag. The car was dead on its Fall 2004 arrival. It would last only two model years, and by the end of 2006, Saab was offering so many sales incentives to move them off of lots that many were sold for thousands less than their more pedestrian Subaru-badged cousins.

GM also decided to come late to the SUV party with the Saab brand. But because they'd spent so much money revitalizing Cadillac, they didn't want to spend too much on a vehicle that would ultimately compete for buyers with the much-loved SRX. So they took a mediocre Chevy Trailblazer, threw on a Saab grille and clear-lens taillights, put the ignition key on the console, and sold it as the 9-7X in 2006.

For a car company that pioneered transverse front-wheel-drive and small, turbocharged 4-cylinder engines, the "TrollBlazer" was simply anathema. It was a clumsy, inline-6 or V8-powered, rear-drive biased, Ohio-built marketing exercise of extreme cynicism. What it was good at was making Saabphiles do spit takes at their televisions whenever it appeared in "Born From Jets" commercials. What it was not good at was just about everything else, particularly getting anyone to buy it.

By 2006, though, GM began a wholehearted effort to right the entire ship, and that included trying to fix Saab. The company showed an excellent concept called the Aero X at the 2006 Geneva Motor Show. People gasped at its beauty. They were awed by its aircraft-style canopy door/roof assembly. And they were reassured by GM management that Saab still had some life left in it.

GM spent the years since then revamping the product line and preparing Saab for a future of bright new models. But when the financial crisis hit, GM just didn't have the money to finish the job it started. With production at Saab's one manufacturing plant at 45% capacity, extremely high labor costs, and huge inefficiencies at the plant itself, GM was losing about $5,000 on every Saab sold. And they couldn't justify taking US and Canadian taxpayer dollars to continue to fund a potential turnaround in Sweden.

So Saab, the advanced, idiosyncratic automotive division created from an aircraft company, has called its last "Mayday". It's on a rapid descent and headed for a mountainside. If these 11.5th hour deals don't go through, and the company crashes, it will certainly be a tragedy.

Let's hope that someone will pull up on the controls in time.

Who Put the "Crisis" In "Chrysler"? (Part 1 of 2)

2009-12-13T14:53:00.000-08:00

The Chrysler Corporation is an 84 year-old with Bipolar Disorder. There is no better way to describe the company.

Their history reads like a giant roller-coaster ride of manically high highs and depressively low lows. In the last 30 years alone, Chrysler has been at death's door 3 separate times (1979-81, 1990-92, 2007-present), and taken US Government bailout money twice (in 1980 and 2008/9).

They were on the ropes in the early 1960s because they downsized their cars when everyone wanted them bigger and more powerful; the early '50s because they'd restyled the entire line way too conservatively for the first "Age of American Excess"; the mid-'30s because they'd practically bet the farm on odd-looking aerodynamic "Airflow" cars that were too far ahead of their time for people's tastes; and were founded by Walter P. Chrysler in the midst of the collapse of Maxwell-Chalmers in the mid-1920s.

But their highs have been incredible. After being saddled for half a decade with stodgy designs, Chrysler debuted new "Forward Look" cars in 1955 and '57 that sent GM and Ford scrambling to compete. Chrysler's longer, lower, wider designs, advanced engineering, and pioneering features pushed Plymouth, Dodge, DeSoto, Chrysler, and Imperial sales through the long, sweeping roof and set trends the industry would follow for years.

The late '60s and early '70s were kind to Chrysler, as well. Their big and midsize cars got slick "fuselage" styling. Their muscle cars were hot and there were plenty of them (Duster 340, Barracuda, GTX, Road Runner, Superbird, Challenger, Charger, Charger Daytona, Coronet Super Bee, and Sport Fury GT). Their all-new trucks and vans were winning people over. And their compact Darts and Valiants were selling out to the bare walls.

With Lee Iaccoca at the helm in the '80s, Chrysler climbed out of the grave by introducing the popular, economical K-Cars, the reintroding the convertible, and inventing the minivan. Chrysler came back quickly enough in the '80s to repay their government bailout loans ahead of schedule. They were doing so well, in fact, they went on to purchase American Motors, the fourth volume American vehicle manufacturer, in 1987, and picked up AMC's hugely profitable Jeep division for $1.1 billion in the process.

And as recently as 1998, the smallest of the Detroit Three was the most profitable among them. Chrysler had been totally turned around from its early '90s slump by offering swoopy "cab-forward" sedans (e.g., Dodge Intrepid, Chrysler Cirrus, Plymouth Neon), "rule-changing" Ram pickups, minivans for which they'd "thought of everything", and wild concept cars like the Viper and Prowler that were brought to production largely unchanged from their show car forebears.

So, what happened this time? Why is Chrysler once again swirling the drain, taking bailout money, and producing lousy, unimaginative products? Hadn't they learned their many lessons from the past?They probably had, actually.

The year (i.e., 1998) Chrysler registered record profits from its onslaught of attractive new models, it was bought out by Daimler-Benz (owners of Mercedes-Benz and Freightliner) for a cool $36 billion. The merged pair was called DaimlerChrysler. Robert Eaton, then head of Chrysler and one of the proponents of the marriage, declared it to the press as a "merger of equals". Industry people were skeptical, though, seeing little opportunity for cost-saving manufacturing synergies between the two car companies. Their skepticism turned out to be well-founded.

In as little as one year, the management responsible for Chrysler's '90s ascent (Robert Eaton, Robert Lutz, Thomas Stallkamp, and others) were forced out as the German arm of the business flexed its muscles. Soon, jokes like "Q: How do you pronounce 'DaimlerChrysler'? A: 'Daimler'. The 'Chrysler' is silent" about the so-called "merger of equals" began to circulate.

As former Daimler execs began to fill key roles at Chrysler, they promptly proceeded to botch new product introductions. Demand for the 2001 PT Cruiser was vastly misjudged, and Chrysler lost thousands of sales because the hot new hatchbacks were in short of supply for too long at dealers. Conversely, the new-for-2001 minivans came out too early in the year and had to compete with a glut of heavily-discounted prior-generation 2000 models on dealer lots.

The new executive team also confused their marketing strategies for Chrysler's four brands (i.e., Chrysler, Dodge, Jeep, and Plymouth). First, their plan was to keep the Dodge brand as the company's mass-market Chevrolet and Toyota rival, and to move Chrysler upscale to compete with the likes of Acura, Infiniti, and Lexus. But when they decided to cancel the Plymouth brand in 2001, they left Chrysler-Plymouth dealers no low-cost models to sell. So management capitulated to dealer requests and offered stripped-out Chrysler models to replace the lost sales volume from Plymouth's exit. This meant that the Chrysler division's brand image was diluted by offering vehicles that competed for the same customers that Dodge was supposed to attract.

And then came the cost-cutting, layoffs, and plant closings, all of which were directed exclusively at the American side of the business. Updates to Chrysler's once-excellent line of cars, trucks, minivans, and SUVs were delayed or canceled altogether as the foreign and domestic competition surpassed Chrysler's vehicles in quality, performance, design, and refinement. What new model introductions there were continued to be mishandled (2002 Jeep Liberty, 2003 Chrysler Pacifica) and the vehicles themselves were being made out of cheaper components to save money. All the while, the press were wondering when DaimlerChrysler would get around to sharing Mercedes's premium components with Chrysler's vehicles.

That didn't happen until 2003, as Chrysler's more expensive vehicles began to incorporate odds and ends from discontinued Mercedes-Benzes. For example, the 2003 Pacifica used Mercedes-Benz power seat controls. The 2004 Crossfire used the interior and chassis of the old Mercedes-Benz SLK, just as Mercedes introduced an all-new SLK. And the 2005 Chrysler 300 used the previous generation Mercedes E-Class rear suspension. While these parts were fine in and of themselves, they were obsolete castoffs, not the cutting-edge technology the Chrysler side needed to get back to respectability amid the continually advancing competition.

There was an image problem, too. The Chryslers that used Benz's old tech failed to get credit for being "all-American" to buyers who cared about things like that. And buyers who didn't care so much were turned off that the German-engineered bits they incorporated were hand-me-downs.

Taken together, Daimler's actions meant that customers looked elswhere for a new car. Sales, market share, and profitability tumbled. This triggered a round of even deeper budget cuts, and Chrysler's vehicles fell still further behind the competition. Before long, DaimlerChrysler was outsourcing much of Chrysler's engine design to Mitsubishi and Hyundai, and entire platform engineering for their compact and midsize cars to Mitsubishi, as well. When the resulting vehicles - the Caliber, Compass, Patriot, Avenger, and Sebring - were released, they were so poorly designed, equipped, and made that they did worse on the market than their mediocre, long-in-the-tooth predecessors had done just the year before.

By the time Daimler decided to sell Chrysler in 2007, the American arm of the company was deemed to be technically worthless, as its debts had exceeded its asset values. It had now become clear that Daimler's plan in 1998 wasn't to create a "merger of equals", but to get its hands on Chrysler's pile of money and use Chrysler's sales volumes to obtain vehicle components more cheaply. But, due to mismanagment, the plan backfired badly for Daimler. When Chrysler's sinking fortunes began to threaten the German arm's financial health, the directors decided to sell what was left of the American operation. Cerberus Capital Management, a private equity firm, scooped up the beleaguered automaker for a paltry $7.4 billion in 2007, and Daimler ate the $28.6 billion loss in investment.

Cerberus re-branded the company "The New Chrysler" at the time of the takeover, and instantly got in over its head. Sales and market share continued eroding. The company's biggest money-makers, their trucks and SUVs, couldn't be given away when fuel prices skyrocketed to $4.50/gallon. And Chrysler had no adequate entries in the compact or subcompact car segments, just as demand for vehicles in those segments shot off the charts. Cerberus's only solution to Chrysler's woes was to slash costs - and employee headcount - to the bone. Morale tumbled, and the company began to experience "brain drain", as much of their design, engineering, and managerial talent bailed, moving on to greener pastures at competing companies.

The New Chrysler desperately cast out for new alliances, lurching from Nissan to Hyundai/Kia to VW, and even to GM in order that it might save money on vehicle development costs by going in halvsies with those companies. And in the meantime, their lacklustre DaimlerChrysler-era product line soldiered on, underdeveloped, inadequately designed and engineered, and aging, with precious little in the way of development funds to fix their shortcomings.

But once the financial meltdown in September 2008 hit, all bets were off. Cerberus, a private equity group first and foremost was suddenly found to be taking a bath in its own blood. Most automakers saw their sales fall 25-35% instantly. Chrysler's fell 50%. It wasn't long before Cerberus was forced to the bargaining table in Washington, DC with hats in hand, begging for money until a buyer could be found for the basket case of a company that Chrysler had become.

So, for the second time, Chrysler received bailout funds from the Federal Government, beginning in late 2008, and continuing through June 2009. But the Obama Administration, recognizing the far-gone state of Chrysler, awarded the funds on the condition that they would submit to a takeover by the Fiat Auto Group and be run by its CEO, Sergio Marchionne. Failing that, the only other option was to go out of business altogether, liquidate the company's assets to pay of its prodigious debt, and put tens of thousands of people out of work.

The deal with Fiat did go through. On June 10, 2009, Chrysler emerged from the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy process, after a blazing 42 days in court. However, the "quick rinse" process involved awarding Chrysler to its third set of owners in two years. The United Auto Workers's Voluntary Employee Benefits Association (VEBA) took a 55% stake in the company, Fiat snapped up 20%, with an option to increase its stake to 35%, and the American and Canadian governments took the remaining 25%.

What happens next is up to CEO Sergio Marchionne and his team. To his credit, Marchionne was largely responsible for bringing Fiat AG back from the brink they'd face in 2004. But with sales having fallen so drastically, market share that's plummeted from 15% to 8%, and a mostly empty product pipeline, he has his work cut out for him.

Marchionne has moved fast, though. Since June, sweeping changes have been made to Chrysler's management structure. A few new products have been rushed into the pipeline, as well, filling some of the empty space left by Cerberus's drastic cuts. Vehicles like the 2010 Dodge Ram Heavy-Duty (just announced as Motor Trend's 2010 Truck of the Year), 2011 Jeep Grand Cherokee, and 2011 Chrysler 300 look to be massive steps in the right direction. And the management team just released its "5-Year Plan" to the public in a marathon 8-hour press conference on November 4. So they're hard at work.

But it begs the question: Will the new treatments administered by the Italian therapists be enough? Will Chrysler survive? Is it headed toward recovery, with its bipolar tendencies relegated to history? Can it grow and thrive in a steady, stable, and profitable manner?

Tune in soon for the second part of this series, "Taking the 'Crisis' Out of 'Chrysler'", to find out.

Why GM would really rather have Buick

2009-12-05T18:12:00.000-08:00

Since GM announced the phaseout of the Pontiac brand, many automotive enthusiasts have been scratching their heads.

"Why oh why", they ask, "is GM keeping Buick, a brand with one foot in the grave and customers to match, while they kick a storied performance brand like Pontiac to the curb?" Their songs of lament are beginning to sound the same.

Verse One usually invokes all the Pontiac patron saints, from the canonized (GTO, Firebird, Trans Am), to the merely venerable (Grand Prix, Bonneville), to the dubious (Fiero). As they don their sackcloth and plop down on piles of ashes, the Disciples of Pontiac start Verse Two, which tells of the recent introduction of the critically acclaimed G8 and Solstice and the justice they've done to the brand's good name. And throwing dust into the air, they flow into Verse Three, mourning the unkept promise of a future wherein Pontiac would become a performance car-only "niche brand". A future with nary a re-grilled Chevy Aveo (G3), Cobalt (G5), or Equinox (Torrent) to be seen. A promise GM couldn't afford to keep. And in between each verse is a rousing chorus of "Why oh Why", sung with crocodile tears flowing. It's getting a little old.

Truth be told, it was a sad day this last April 27th, when GM announced that they were pulling the plug on one of their most damaged, yet storied and dynamic brands.

Started in 1926 by GM as a companion marque to now-defunct Oakland, Pontiac (after the Native chief, and an Oakland County, MI town) enjoyed an 84-season run. In fact, the last arrowhead badge was just affixed to a white G6 sedan, which left the Fairfax, KS assembly line on November 25th, 2009.

Since the late 1940s, Pontiac lived a rung above Chevrolet and below Oldsmobile on the GM brand ladder. By the mid-'60s, they were known as GM's rebellious "We Build Excitement" division, and they had stuff like the GTO and Firebird to back up their claims. But when the oil embargo of 1973-74 hit, fuel prices skyrocketed. And Pontiac began a struggle to stay true to its performance image while offering cars with enough economy to satisfy customer demands. It was a battle they'd eventually lose.

Conversely, Buick was started in 1903 by David Dunbar Buick, and was the company from which General Motors sprang in 1908. Later that year, Buick bought out an independent Oldsmobile, and the new company picked up GMC Truck, Oakland, Cadillac, Chevrolet, and others between 1909 and 1917. Since the founding of GM, Buick has been positioned as an upscale brand, slotting above Oldsmobile and below Cadillac in the GM hierarchy.

Up through the 1970s, Buick enjoyed an enviable reputation as a builder of large, powerful, high-quality, plush cars. They became known as "doctors' cars", as they were often the choice of professionals who appreciated the finer things, but didn't want their clients to think they were making Cadillac-type money off of them. Buick's long-held tagline, "Wouldn't You Really Rather Have a Buick?" perfectly encapsulated the understated, aspirational quality of the brand. And the formula worked for a very long time. Buick sales peaked in North America in 1984, with 1 million cars bearing the tri-shield sold that year.

However, in the years since, GM has seen their market share erode to the imports while the piled on other responsibilities. At one point, Buick was one of 9 North American vehicle divisions GM had to juggle. GM would cope by giving each division the same basic vehicles, in order to hold down costs. Yet each brand had to figure out a way of differentiating their vehicles from their sister brands' in hopes that each brand's lineup would attract a different set of customers and thus prove its worth. But with eroding share, the shrinking pot of money GM had meant that less and less could be allocated to each brand. So the differences between Chevys, Pontiacs, GMCs, Oldsmobiles, Buicks, and Cadillacs became very muddled as GM added Saab, Saturn, and Hummer to the portfolio.

With this business model, Buick became the brand full of sensible shoes, wallowy sedans with bench seats, column shifters, and wire wheel covers. They were cars that were meant to attract the hats-in-the-back-window crowd. And it worked. By 2000, Buick's average buyer age was 67 years old, and sales were less than half of what they'd been 15 years earlier. Since 2000, Buick sales have fallen another 60%, as they managed to move barely 200,000 vehicles in the 2007 model year. The problem with GM's strategy for Buick was that the brand was positioned in such a way that it stopped being relevant to younger buyers. Ignored were demands for console-mounted shifters, bucket seats, alloy wheels, and firmer suspensions that prevented their cars from cornering on their chromed doorhandles. All the while, the customers Buick was attracting were literally dying off.

So it's understandable why some people, particularly the Pontiac faithful, would be confused about why GM kept Buick, but deep-sixed Pontiac. Dig a little deeper, though, and the logic presents itself. Let me explain.

1) Buick actually isn't for old people anymore. While no one was looking, Buick started offering models that younger people and families would actually buy. This started with the introduction of the Rendezvous crossover in 2002 and continued with its excellent replacement, the Enclave, in 2008. Since then, Buick's average buyer age has dropped from 67 in 2000 to 54 in 2009. Toyota's average buyer is 51. Lexus's is 59.

2) Also while no one was looking, Buick became one of the hottest-selling brands in China, now the world's largest auto market. GM isn't about to give that up. Instead, they see vast potential in converging the more successful Chinese Buick lineup with the one offered here in the US. That way, they only have to engineer one Buick for both markets, while building the new Buicks in both countries so they aren't vulnerable to exchange rate issues.

Pontiac, conversely, was only present in the US, Canada, and Mexico, and wasn't growing anywhere the brand was available.

3) Buick has introduced a spate of relevant automobiles, like the aforementioned Enclave, the 2010 LaCrosse, and the just-announced 2011 Regal. All three of these vehicles feature bold designs, phenomenal interiors (no bench seats or column shifters), excellent refinement, high build quality, and fuel efficiency. With all this new, attractive metal, the outlook is good for Buick's image, and therefore sales. And because the new cars are fuel-efficient, they help GM meet the new federally-mandated Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards. And none of the three aforementioned models is a toothy-grilled version of a Chevy, GMC, or Cadillac. GM has differentiated Buick's line because they can afford to make Buicks truly different and more upscale, as Buicks command much higher transaction prices than Pontiacs had.

Pontiac was stuck in a double-bind. GM could spend the money to make Pontiacs that looked and felt totally different from the Chevrolets they were based on. Which is what they did with the G6. But at the low, Chevy-like prices Pontiacs commanded, that tack made for thin profit margins. And the cars that resulted just ended up competing with Chevrolet's own versions of the same cars.

Or, GM could just stick a twin-nostril grille on the front of a Chevy and call it a Pontiac, no matter what it did to Pontiac's image (G3, G5, and Torrent). That way, Pontiac could add incremental volume to Chevy, giving the company slightly better economies of scale, while requiring little investment in unique tooling and parts stocks. But that tack would instantly make Pontiac moribund, giving customers no good reason to buy a Pontiac over a Chevrolet.

They could even try a third option, offering vehicles totally unique to Pontiac, like they did with the Vibe, G8, and to a lesser extent, the Solstice. But the Australian-made G8, while excellent, sold poorly and was difficult to make money on because of exchange rate issues. The Solstice, a 2-seat sports car, never sold in any meaningful volume. It wasn't meant to. And the Vibe was a joint venture with Toyota, sharing engines and an interior with the Matrix. Not exactly a proper enthusiast-pleasing Pontiac, either.

The thing is, Pontiac tried all three options simultaneously and what emerged was neither fish

nor fowl. Customers were given little reason to go to their Pontiac dealer, and they didn't have a consistent enough product line for the brand to gain favor with the press. In the end, the strategy didn't make GM any real money, nor did it pave a clear pathway to a bright future. And a GM staring down bankruptcy needed to move forward with a plan that did.

4) Buick topped the 2009 JD Power Vehicle Dependability Survey, knocking Lexus off its long-held perch. The results even prompted mention in President Obama's March 30 Press Conference. If Buick has any story to tell, it's one of quality and reliability. That's a story GM wants to pound into the minds of import buyers as Buick wows them with classy styling, quality, refinement, and delightful interiors.

Pontiac was consistently below average in JD Power's reliability surveys. Part of it may have been down to the total inconsistency of the lineup. But most of it was because GM just couldn't afford to put much development money into Pontiac and expect to get it back.

5) Buick was the foundation of the formation of GM in 1908. It's got massive sentimental value to GM. Buick is GM's roots. Pontiac was created out of thin air by GM in 1926 as a companion to a brand they ended up cancelling after 1932.

6) Internally, many of GM's youngest designers have chosen specifically to work on the Buicks in development now. Armed with fresh ideas, they see plenty of opportunity to make their mark, accepting the challenge of restoring the lustre of the proud old marque. So it would appear that Buick's design portfolio may have the bright, exciting future the division needs in order to grow in relevance to today's buyers. With Pontiac, designers weren't going to get excited about sticking a split grille on the front of a Chevy and calling it good. Or having to design a car of compromises on the cheap.

7) While Pontiac has sold significantly more cars than Buick in recent years, Pontiac has been offering more than twice the number of models. So, the Buick line has actually sold better per model than Pontiac's did. And more profitably, at that. Especially since 60% of Pontiac's sales were in low-margin fleets and daily rental agencies. Buick has a higher percentage of retail customers.

8) Buick has a future in the kinds of smaller cars GM needs to build. They certainly have a strong past building and selling smaller cars. The '61 Buick Special/Skylark did nothing if not totally revitalize the brand, which had been through difficult times in the late '50s and early '60s. And Buick sold so many Skylarks from 1975-85, that they consistently outsold their less expensive, but oh-so-similar Pontiac, and Oldsmobile stable mates. Simply put, more success has been found in making economical cars plush and luxurious enough to be proper Buicks than than performance-oriented enough to be considered proper Pontiacs.

"Ah!", Pontiac enthusiasts say, "All that is well and good, but why not turn Pontiac into the performance car 'niche brand' by keeping the Solstice and the excellent G8? Just like GM talked about previously?" For good reasons, actually.

1) Pontiac's true performance vehicles were the G8 and Solstice. As noted before, neither of them sold worth a damn unless huge, profit-sucking incentives were placed on their hoods.

2) Offering more performance models just to keep the Pontiac name alive would only make it harder for GM to hit the required CAFE numbers. And Pontiac would still be competing with Chevrolet's SS line, the new Camaro and Corvette, and Cadillac's line of spectacular V-Series cars.

3) Pontiac is a more damaged brand than Buick. Pontiac is associated with laclustre Montanas, plastic-clad Sunfires and Grand Ams, "Screaming Chicken" decals, and - worst of all - the Aztek.

Buick's cars, though until recently were sedate and associated with old people, have never had Pontiac's reputation for overwrought styling with heaps of plastic body cladding that wrote checks the cars' performance levels couldn't cash. Buick has never fielded a car so embarrassing that they were forced to restyle it after one year (Aztek). They've never sold a warmed-over Chevette (T1000) or Daewoo (LeMans, G3), in America either.

Rebuilding a respected performance car image for Pontiac was just too tall an order after their all-too-recent cavalcade of craptastic failures. Seen in that light, Buick has far less of a hole to climb out of.

So when choosing which of the two brands to keep, GM decided they would really rather have Buick. Wouldn't you?